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Articles

Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly
Strategy
Sandeep Vaheesan* & Nathan Schneider†
ABSTRACT
After decades of neglect, antitrust is once again a topic of public
debate. Proponents of reviving antitrust have called for abandoning the
narrow consumer welfare objective and embracing a broader set of
objectives. One essential element that has been overlooked thus far is the
ownership structure of the firm itself. The dominant model of investorowned business and associated philosophy of shareholder wealth
maximization exacerbate the pernicious effects of market power. In
contrast, cooperative ownership models can mitigate the effects of
monopoly and oligopoly, as well as advance the interests of consumers,
workers, small business owners, and citizens. The promotion of fair
competition among large firms should be paired with support for
democratic cooperation within firms.
Antitrust law has had a complicated history and relationship with
cooperative enterprise. Corporations threatened by cooperatives have used
the antitrust laws to frustrate the growth of these alternative businesses. To
*Legal Director, Open Markets Institute.
†Assistant Professor, Department of Media Studies, University of Colorado Boulder.
The authors thank Lauren Bridges, Michelle Meagher, Sanjukta Paul, and Ganesh
Sitaraman for thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts of this Article.
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insulate cooperatives from the antitrust threat, Congress has enacted
exemptions to protect cooperative entities, notably a general immunity for
farm cooperatives in the 1922 Capper-Volstead Act. As part of an agenda
to tame corporate monopoly, all three branches of the federal government
and the states should revisit these ideas and seek to protect and enable the
cooperative model across the economy. Although protections that farmers
fought for a century ago may seem obsolete in an era of big-box retail and
online platforms, matters of ownership design have at least as much
relevance today and should be a part of the antimonopoly arsenal.
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INTRODUCTION

Antitrust is back. In the words of former Acting Assistant Attorney
General Renata Hesse, “It is, as it was at its inception, the stuff of popular
imagination.”1 This legal and policy regime, which has been in retreat for
as long as many of us can remember,2 has regained some of the spirit and
urgency that led to its early development3—if not yet the legislative
ingenuity or political will. Democratic Party politicians are taking notice:
Senator Elizabeth Warren, at first,4 and, subsequently, party leaders whose
2017 “A Better Deal” document called for “cracking down on corporate
monopolies.”5 This mood has even taken hold among some Republicans,
especially the populist wing emboldened by the presidency of Donald
Trump.6 For example, the Trump administration broke with recent practice
when it attempted to block the proposed vertical merger of AT&T and
Time Warner.7 From different points of view and for different reasons,
1. Renata Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Opening Remarks
at 2016 Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium: And Never the Twain Shall Meet?
Connecting Popular and Professional Visions for Antitrust Enforcement (Sept. 20, 2016),
available at https://bit.ly/2dwx2qV.
2. By way of example, the Department of Justice has filed only one monopolization
suit in the past 20 years. Antitrust Div. Workload Stats. FY 2009 – 2018,
http://bit.ly/2ZYz0Vr; Antitrust Div. Workload Stats. FY 2000 – 2009,
http://bit.ly/2KNGHY6. For a review of antitrust law’s historical development and
changing objectives and rules, see generally Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisms
of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. REV. 370 (2014). The prevailing consumer welfare model is neither
consistent with the original motivations of antitrust law nor adequate to address emerging
concentrations of economic and political power. See John J. Flynn, The Reagan
Administration’s Antitrust Policy, Original Intent, and the Legislative History of the
Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 303 (1988).
3. For instance, Lina Khan published a widely circulated Yale Law Journal note on
the clout of Amazon and contemporary antitrust law’s blindness to its power. See generally
Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 56 (2017).
4. Mario Trujillo, Warren Targets Amazon, Apple, Google in Anti-Monopoly
Speech, THE HILL (June 29, 2016, 1:12 PM), https://bit.ly/2JQt3FB.
5. A Better Deal, SENATE DEMOCRATS, https://bit.ly/2MosdlG (last visited June 1,
2019).
6. Former Trump campaign CEO and senior counselor, Steve Bannon, reportedly
believes major online platforms like Facebook and Google should be regarded as
monopolistic utilities. See Ryan Grim, Steve Bannon Wants Facebook and Google
Regulated Like Utilities, THE INTERCEPT (July 27, 2017, 9:31 AM), https://bit.ly/2tH31c8.
That said, Bannon’s and the Trump administration’s support for antimonopoly policy
should be treated with deep skepticism. While supporting public utility regulation for tech
platforms, Bannon also seeks the “deconstruction of the administrative state”—the same
administrative that would regulate entities like Facebook and Google. See Jon
Michaels, How Trump Is Dismantling a Pillar of the American State, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
7, 2017, 8:36 AM), https://bit.ly/2iDkiyQ.
7. Steven Overly & Josh Gerstein, Trump Administration Sues to Block AT&T-Time
Warner Merger, POLITICO (Nov. 20, 2017, 8:59 PM), https://politi.co/2zUHbYU. United
States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (affirming district court’s
denial of government’s request for preliminary injunction against the merger). The Obama
administration, in contrast, permitted large vertical consolidations to proceed on the
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many politicians and public figures are coming to agree with the
assessment of Nobel-laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz: “America has a
monopoly problem—and it’s huge.”8
With this renewed interest in antitrust, citizens, legislators, and
regulators should consider a full range of ideas and strategies to address
the economic and political power of large corporations. This Article
reconsiders one little-discussed component of the antimonopoly tradition
in the United States and argues for its renewed relevance to help resolve
the challenges of the present—cooperative enterprise. In addition to the
structure of markets, citizens and lawmakers recognized a century ago that
the structure of the firm itself has important economic, political, and social
ramifications. The architects of antitrust law, under pressure from
constituents, enacted a series of exemptions and accommodations, mainly
on behalf of rural economies. By passing exemption and accommodation
laws, Congress aimed to protect democratically owned and governed
businesses and collectives from antitrust suits and to support these entities
as a means of countering the power of monopolistic corporations. These
principles deserve to be taken at least as seriously today, including for
applications far beyond their agrarian origins. The promotion of fair
competition among large firms should be paired with support for
democratic cooperation within firms.
Antitrust law and cooperatives (or co-ops) have a long and
complicated history. Antitrust enforcement, and the threat of enforcement,
has affected cooperative activity for more than a century. In particular,
antitrust law’s strict prohibition of horizontal collusion has sometimes
been an impediment to socially beneficial cooperation among consumers,
farmers, workers, and other powerless actors. Congress and the courts
have attempted to accommodate cooperatives under antitrust law. Since
farmers have been the group of cooperators best organized to promote their
interests, Congress has principally enacted antitrust exemptions to protect
agricultural cooperatives.9 Fully-integrated cooperatives, which bring
independent entities together to create a new product or business, have
won recognition in the courts. Supreme Court justices have recognized the
significance of cooperative models in cases regarding entities ranging
condition that they agree to non-discrimination and other behavioral remedies. See, e.g.,
United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 147–48 (D.D.C. 2011); United States
v. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., 1:10-cv-00139, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88626 (D.D.C.
July 30, 2010). Before the AT&T complaint, the federal antitrust enforcers had not sought
to block a vertical merger in nearly forty years. See generally Fruehauf Corp. v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
8. Joseph E. Stiglitz, America Has a Monopoly Problem—and It’s Huge, THE
NATION (Oct. 23, 2017), https://bit.ly/2y3kD3z.
9. James L. Guth, Farmer Monopolies, Cooperatives, and the Intent of Congress:
Origins of the Capper-Volstead Act, 56 AGRIC. HIST. 67, 82 (1982).
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from the Associated Press (“AP”), a co-op of news agencies,10 to Topco,
a co-op of small grocery stores.11 With the growing political appetite for
antitrust policy to confront today’s equivalents of the old railroads and
telegraph networks,12 the rich and complicated history between
cooperatives and antitrust should be rediscovered and studied.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the competitive and
social impacts of dominant ownership models and their relevance to
antitrust concerns. Part II turns to cooperative models and shows how they
can mitigate the harms of monopoly and advance a broader set of
economic, political, and social interests than businesses committed to
shareholder wealth maximization do. Part III reviews the entanglements
between cooperatives and antitrust law and the historical efforts of
accommodating cooperatives in the antitrust framework. Part IV presents
a series of legislative and regulatory ideas on how the cooperative model
can be protected and promoted across the economy.
II.

THE RELEVANCE OF OWNERSHIP DESIGN

Business ethicist Marjorie Kelly usefully employs the language of
“ownership design” and, in turn, distinguishes “extractive” from
“generative” corporate structures.13 For Kelly, extractive company
ownership designs are those that seek “maximum physical and financial
extraction” on behalf of investor-owners.14 “The generative economy,” in
contrast, “is one whose fundamental architecture tends to create beneficial
rather than harmful outcomes.”15 Kelly’s characterizations may seem to
over rely on the eye of the beholder, but Kelly goes on to make a
10. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 50 (1945).
11. As stated by Justice Thurgood Marshall in the majority opinion:
Members of the association vary in the degree of market share that they possess
in their respective areas. The range is from 1.5% to 16%, with the average being
approximately 6%. While it is difficult to compare these figures with the market
shares of larger regional and national chains because of the absence in the record
of accurate statistics for these chains, there is much evidence in the record that
Topco members are frequently in as strong a competitive position in their
respective areas as any other chain. The strength of this competitive position is
due, in some measure, to the success of Topco-brand products. Although only
10% of the total goods sold by Topco members bear the association’s brand
names, the profit on these goods is substantial and their very existence has
improved the competitive potential of Topco members with respect to other large
and powerful chains.
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 600 (1972)
12. Robinson Meyer, How to Fight Amazon (Before You Turn 29), ATLANTIC,
http://bit.ly/31Dcx0v (last visited June 29, 2018).
13. MARJORIE KELLY, OWNING OUR FUTURE: THE EMERGING OWNERSHIP
REVOLUTION 1–18 (2012).
14. Id. at 11.
15. Id.
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compelling case that when company ownership lies with participantstakeholders—such as with workers, customers, or mission-driven
foundations—rather than profit-seeking investors, companies are able to
engage in more pro-social behaviors and avoid abuses of market power.16
Kelly’s findings have been echoed in a variety of studies.17 Ownership
design has been an essential, but often overlooked, ingredient in
addressing the mounting crisis of corporate consolidation.18
Advocates of an antitrust renaissance have an ample record of
evidentiary support. For example, two-thirds of economic sectors in the
United States economy became more consolidated between 1997 and
2012.19 Although such concentration alone may not be illegal under the
current interpretation of antitrust law,20 it is grounds for broader economic
and political concern. Additionally, rates of firm creation have declined in
comparison to rates of exit, to the point of convergence.21 The “consumer
welfare” or “efficiency” regime, which has defined much of the current
antitrust practice,22 has failed on its own terms. Empirical research has
16. See generally id.
17. On economic efficiencies, see Svend Albæk & Christian Schultz, On the Relative
Advantage of Cooperatives, 59 ECON. LETTERS 397, 401 (1998); on member benefit, see
Petter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899, 941 (2014); on
stability and productivity, see VIRGINIE PÉROTIN, WHAT DO WE REALLY KNOW ABOUT
WORKER COOPERATIVES? 20 (2016), available at https://bit.ly/1OpS5TC; on broad-based
wealth creation, see Joseph Blasi et al., Having a Stake: Evidence and Implications for
Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership and Profit Sharing, THIRD WAY,
https://bit.ly/2H536Oo (last updated Feb. 1, 2017).
18. But see Phillip Longman, The Case for Small-Business Cooperation, WASH.
MONTHLY (Nov./Dec. 2018), http://bit.ly/2MilgS7.
19. Too Much of a Good Thing, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016),
https://econ.st/2PEdrYl.
20. Hesse, supra note 1. Although resolved decisively as yes in recent decades, the
question of whether dominant firms must engage in exclusionary or predatory conduct to
violate antimonopoly law has a rich history in U.S. antitrust. Compare United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (“The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman
Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”), with Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945):
In order to fall within § 2, the monopolist must have both the power to
monopolize, and the intent to monopolize. To read the passage as demanding any
“specific,” intent, makes nonsense of it, for no monopolist monopolizes
unconscious of what he is doing. So here, “Alcoa” meant to keep, and did keep,
that complete and exclusive hold upon the ingot market with which it started.
That was to “monopolize” that market, however innocently it otherwise
proceeded.
Id. at 432.
21. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF
MARKET POWER 5 (2016), available at https://bit.ly/3127SFQ.
22. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed
the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”) (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE

ART 1 - COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

10/22/2019 4:02 PM

COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE AS AN ANTIMONOPOLY STRATEGY

7

shown a strong positive association between market concentration, prices,
and mark-ups.23 Furthermore, an influential meta-study of merger
retrospective analyses found price increases and reduction in output in
approximately 80 percent of cases, along with trends toward decreased
investment in research and development.24
Shareholder wealth maximization serves to accelerate
monopolization of the economy and to supercharge the socially harmful
consequences of concentrated power. The ideology of “shareholder
primacy”25 privileges the interests of stockholders, who are
disproportionately wealthy,26 above those of workers, customers, or the
general public, and has faced less political challenge in the United States
than in other developed nations.27 Shareholder primacy often promotes the
acquisition and exercise of monopoly and oligopoly power because it
stresses short-term cash flow generation that can support dividends and
share buybacks.28 Investment banks counsel their clients that consolidation
tends to boost investor returns.29 Thanks to concentrated market structures,
corporate profitability and returns to capital investors have been strong.30
Yet, in addition to the reasons for doubting that consolidation benefits
consumers, it may have a causal relationship (alongside declining union

ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1 (2010), https://bit.ly/21jA9Tt (“Regardless of how
enhanced market power likely would be manifested, the Agencies normally evaluate
mergers based on their impact on customers.”).
23. See, e.g., Gustavo Grullon et al., Are U.S. Industries Becoming More
Concentrated?, 23 REV. FIN. 697, 698–99 (2019); Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The
Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 23687, 2017), https://bit.ly/2ZkbIZl; Bruce A. Blonigen &
Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency 24
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22750, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2X9NkMA.
24. JOHN E. KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF US POLICY 112–13, 159 (2015).
25. Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of its Fall, and the
Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2013).
26. See Thomas L. Hungerford, Changes in Income Inequality Among U.S. Tax Filers
between 1991 and 2006: The Role of Wages, Capital Income, and Taxes (2013),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2207372.
27. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 104–05 (2003).
28. William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, 92 HARV. BUS. REV. 46–55(Sept.
2014), available at https://bit.ly/1yd02Ff.
29. Too Much of a Good Thing, supra note 19; Marc Jarsulic et al., Reviving
Antitrust: Why Our Economy Needs a Progressive Competition Policy, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (June 29, 2016 at 12:01 A.M.), https://ampr.gs/30Vy7xI; Robert D. Boroujerdi
et al., Does Consolidation Create Value?, GOLDMAN SACHS (Feb. 12, 2014),
https://bit.ly/2QGnOc2.
30. The Problem with Profits, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), https://econ.st/2Z6luOS.

ART 1 - COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE (DO NOT DELETE)

8

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

10/22/2019 4:02 PM

[Vol. 124:1

density and other factors) with the wage stagnation31 that has beset the
United States economy since the 1970s.32 Tellingly, when managers at
investor-owned businesses have sought to share some of their profits with
workers they have faced backlash from Wall Street.33 In contrast to
shareholders, other stakeholder groups have a broader set of concerns than
short-term profit maximization34 and would likely not insist on this
frenetic consolidation activity.
Investor motivations for consolidation seem especially evident in the
case of the online economy’s platform business models—found in
companies like Google, Amazon, and Facebook—which now constitute
some of the most valuable entities traded on public markets.35 Rather than
simply manufacturing a product and selling it to customers, platform
companies create and control multi-sided markets designed to capture
entire sectors of the economy.36 Venture-capital financiers, who tend to
gain ownership and governance rights in such companies at their early
stages, often expect and demand “exponential” growth, which encourages
monopolistic behavior.37 Moreover, such platforms rely on “network
effects” for proper function. A critical mass of users is necessary for the
platform to function at all, and once that critical mass is achieved, new
entrants can face insurmountable obstacles to challenging incumbents.38
Financing strategies, the resulting ownership designs, and network effects
thus converge to result in firms designed for consolidation on the behalf
of investor-owners.
These dominant platforms can offer a wide selection of products at
low prices and, on the surface, can be congenial to consumers. Some
platform companies, like Google and Facebook, do not charge for their

31. See Nathan Wilmers, Wage Stagnation and Buyer Power: How Buyer-Supplier
Relations Affect U.S. Workers’ Wages, 1978 to 2014, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 213, 230–32
(2018); José Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 24147, 2019), https://bit.ly/2II7vI7 (noting the relation between market
concentration and wage stagnation).
32. Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does
Employer Concentration Affect Wages? 23–24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 24307, 2018), https://bit.ly/2HnHAqq.
33. See, e.g., Justin Bachman, American’s CEO Sides with Airline Workers Against
Wall Street, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2017, 11:29 A.M.), https://bloom.bg/2RkX6X7.
34. See Stout, supra note 25, at 1171.
35. See The 100 Largest Companies in the World by Market Value in 2018 (in Billion
U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://bit.ly/2IDS8AJ (last visited Sep. 6, 2019)
36. Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, 32 ISSUES
SCI. & TECH. 61, 61–62 (2016).
37. See, e.g., Dirk Engel, The Impact of Venture Capital on Firm Growth: An
Empirical Investigation 7 (ZEW, Disc. Paper No. 02-02, 2002), https://bit.ly/2X8PjRh.
38. GEOFFREY G. PARKER ET AL., PLATFORM REVOLUTION: HOW NETWORKED
MARKETS ARE TRANSFORMING THE ECONOMY AND HOW TO MAKE THEM WORK FOR YOU
60 (2016).
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core services. But such benefits come with hidden costs—hidden from
consumers and from an interpretation of antitrust law that looks principally
to consumer prices rather than other harms that might come from
overwhelming market power.39 Investor ownership can further exacerbate
the harms that market power might hold for the common good.
A.

Harms to Consumers

Investor-owned businesses often exercise their market power to make
large short-term profits. Corporations with market power raise prices to
consumers and bolster their bottom-line. In turn, the profits are often
disbursed to shareholders in the form of dividends and stock buybacks that
generate capital gains. This exercise of market power is seen across the
economy in sectors such as airlines,40 pharmaceuticals,41 and telecom.42
Health-care is a telling example: highly concentrated local hospital
markets across the country are a principal driver of increased health care
costs.43 Market power likely transfers a significant fraction of gross
domestic product from ordinary consumers to the disproportionately
affluent executives and shareholders of monopolistic and oligopolistic
businesses.44
In addition to this classic exercise of market power, investor-owned
firms can draw financing as long as they maintain high expectations for
the future value of their shares. Today, the prospect of monopoly profits
in the future can be sufficient to attract investors and support a high share
price. For example, firms might be able to drive competitors out of a
market with below-cost pricing and raise prices once they face fewer
competitive constraints.45 This phenomenon seems to be increasingly
common in the online economy. Highly valued tech platforms like
Amazon and Uber can operate at a loss while they invest in achieving
39. See generally Charles Duhigg, The Case Against Google, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
2018), https://nyti.ms/2BDUsWs.
40. See, e.g., Ying Shen, Market Competition and Market Price: Evidence from
United/Continental Airline Mergers, 10 ECON. TRANSP. 1, 6 (2017).
41. See, e.g., ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA
RAISES PRICES AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET (2017).
42. See, e.g., SUSAN P. CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND
MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2013).
43. See, e.g., Zack Cooper et al., The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health
Spending on the Privately Insured (Nat’l Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 21815,
2018), https://bit.ly/2KfQbge; Alex R. Horsenstein & Manual S. Santos, Understanding
Growth Patterns in U.S. Health Care Expenditures, 17 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 284 (2018).
44. See, e.g., William S. Comanor & Robert H. Smiley, Monopoly and the
Distribution of Wealth, 89 Q. J. ECON. 177, 194 (1975).
45. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Reconsidering Brooke Group: Predatory Pricing in Light
of the Empirical Learning, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 81, 84–94 (2015) (summarizing some
of the case studies and other empirical research documenting dominant firms’ successful
use of below-cost pricing).
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market dominance.46 Consumers experience low or even imperceptible
costs, so they eagerly participate in this process.
Increasingly, investors in diverse industries can count on an
additional source of future returns: consumer data. This data can be sold
on secondary markets or used to create future products for the company
itself.47 Consumers may share their data unknowingly or because they
have no alternative,48 and in many cases the “terms of service” adhesion
contracts they must agree to immunize companies from the consequences
of lawbreaking through mechanisms such as mandatory arbitration and
class-action waivers.49 Furthermore, the unilateral agreements are highly
malleable and imprecise, granting companies sweeping flexibility in their
future use of consumers’ data contributions without those consumers’
knowledge or explicit consent.50 Public commitments about data practices
are no less malleable, such as when Facebook reneged on a promise not to
siphon data from WhatsApp users after purchasing the popular messaging
app.51
These investor-owned, data-driven companies carry out a balancing
act: they must divert consumers’ attention away from the potential uses
and abuses of the data being collected, while at the same time remind
investors of the valuable future opportunities that growing market power
affords. But the scales of this balance are tipped. An investor-owned
company regards consumers as means to the investors’ ends.52 When the

46. See Khan, supra note 3, at 712.
47. Id. at 785–86.
48. JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., THE TRADEOFF FALLACY: HOW MARKETERS ARE
MISREPRESENTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS AND OPENING THEM UP TO EXPLOITATION
(2015), available at https://bit.ly/1F4S958.
49. JAMILA VENTURINI ET AL., TERMS OF SERVICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF ONLINE PLATFORM CONTRACTS (Flavio Jardim & Cibeli Hirsch trans., 2016). The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act expansively to permit
corporations to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses, including class action waivers. See
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2013); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011). For a critical analysis of
contracts of adhesion, see generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013).
50. Casey Fiesler et al., Reality and Perception of Copyright Terms of Service for
Online Content Creation, Conference Report, Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference
on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing (Feb. 27–Mar. 2, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2Id6Mjg. See generally TERMS OF SERVICE; DIDN’T READ, https://tosdr.org
(last visited June 12, 2019).
51. Mike Isaac & Mark Scott, Relaxing Privacy Vow, WhatsApp Will Share Some
Data With Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2Hf7utD.
52. For a comprehensive analysis of how Facebook, Google, and other “surveillance
capitalists” capture and monetize user behavior to drive targeted advertising business, see
generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019).

ART 1 - COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

10/22/2019 4:02 PM

COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE AS AN ANTIMONOPOLY STRATEGY

11

company is forced to choose between those two stakeholder groups’
interests, the ownership design predetermines which will prevail.
B.

Harms to Fair Competition

The threats to open markets posed by ambitious investors in the age
of railroads and telegraph lines are exacerbated in the internet economy.
Data economies, combined with network effects, promise both rewards to
investors and threats to competition. Many of the most profitable new
markets (from personalized advertising to artificial intelligence) depend
on access to vast troves of data. Such data require time, expense, and often
market power to build in the first place.53 Further, companies like Google,
Amazon, and Facebook have each become involved in offering utilitylevel services (such as cloud computing, undersea cables, and internet
service provision) that increasingly put pressure on would-be competitors
to become dependent on them.
Academic and judicial observers have tended to hold that, despite
their size, the large platform companies have only a precarious
dominance.54 They contend that as went MySpace and Friendster so can
Facebook, but there are reasons to believe that the new dominant,
networked firms are different from their predecessors. Unlike MySpace
and Friendster, Facebook, Google, and Amazon have dominated for a
decade or more and appear more protected from competition than ever.55
If this is the case, greater market entrenchment rewards those companies’
investors, especially when antitrust oversight is blind to their power. The
dominant model of investor-owned businesses and philosophy of
shareholder wealth maximization ensure that the interests of executives
and shareholders will capture the lion’s share of spoils from the pervasive
market power in the American political economy.56
The dangers that investor ownership can pose to competition are not
limited to the data-driven online economy. The structure of capital markets
invites investor-dominated firms to exceed market expectations at all
costs. This can lead to socially beneficial behavior, but it can also invite a
firm to seek market dominance as an end in itself. Growth becomes an
overriding imperative; more than stability, sustainability, quality products,

53. See Khan, supra note 3, at 785–86.
54. See, e.g., Justus Haucap & Ulrich Heimeshoff, Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay:
Is the Internet Driving Competition or Market Monopolization?, 11 INT’L ECON. & ECON.
POL’Y 49, (2014).
55. See Ethan Chiel, Can Facebook and Google Be Disrupted?, INTELLIGENCER (Dec.
12, 2017), https://nym.ag/2wNq4p0.
56. See Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 234, 239–45 (2017).
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or other metrics.57 Investment banks likewise tend to view consolidation
as an advantage.58 Especially in a context of weak or non-existent antitrust
rules on exclusionary practices, firms can find that predatory behavior is
cheaper, and more rewarded in capital markets than customer-facing
competition on product quality or price. The advent of diversified
investment funds raises another monopoly concern. When a single
institutional investor holds shares in companies across a given industry,
the investor may seek to dampen risk-taking and innovation to protect the
overall portfolio rather than seeking competitive advantage for any one
firm.59
To discourage the acquisition and exercise of market power on behalf
of investors, the investor-owned firm as an organizational structure should
face competition from other kinds of firms. If investors opt for market
power over product quality, for instance, other kinds of owners can
compete on quality. If investors opt to dampen competition across a
diverse portfolio, firms not owned by investors can stimulate competition
in their place.
C.

Harms to Workers

Growing consolidation has diminished the power and wealth of
workers and hurt the overall standing of labor. Labor market concentration
is associated with lower wages, and most local labor markets across the
country are moderately or highly concentrated.60 Workers in the United
States have experienced wage stagnation or decline for decades.61
Meanwhile, workers who were once salaried employees with medical and
retirement benefits now find themselves working gig-to-gig, without a
safety net from the companies that direct and manage their work.62
Millions of Americans struggle to subsist and face financial ruin if an
emergency strikes.63
57. See generally Myron J. Gordon & Jeffrey S. Rosenthal, Capitalism’s Growth
Imperative, 27 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 25 (2003).
58. See Boroujerdi et al., supra note 29.
59. See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 168–204 (2018).
60. See Benmelech et al., supra note 32, at 23–24; Azar et al., supra note 31, at 17–
18.
61. See Issue Brief # 330, Lawrence Mishel, The Wedges between Productivity and
Median Compensation Growth, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 26, 2012),
https://bit.ly/2wxxD2X.
62. See TREBOR SCHOLZ, UBERWORKED AND UNDERPAID: HOW WORKERS ARE
DISRUPTING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 13 (2017).
63. See FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECON. WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS
IN 2016 2 (2017), https://bit.ly/2qTwKhw (“Forty-four percent of adults say they either
could not cover an emergency expense costing $400, or would cover it by selling something
or borrowing money . . . .”).
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The largest firms whose business occurs primarily online have used
their market power in ways that show little sign of reversing such trends.
On the one hand, large online companies frequently pay their skilled
employees generous salaries and employee stock-purchase plans are
almost commonplace, enabling salaried workers to enjoy the rewards of
investor ownership.64 On the other hand, large online companies employ
far fewer salaried employees than the largest industrial corporations of
earlier generations did—just thousands or tens of thousands, compared to
hundreds of thousands in companies like General Motors and General
Electric.65
Today, both new and old corporations rely more on non-employee
workers and free labor. Online platforms in particular depend on a large
number of non-employee contributors of work—from Uber drivers to
users posting creative content to Facebook. If paid for their services, these
contributors are regarded as contractors and receive less in wages and
benefits and have fewer rights than workers of the past could expect from
such economic giants.66 The arrangement between platforms and nonemployee contractors is one that investors have come to expect and, often
times, encourage.67 Such expectations have encouraged many older
companies to reduce the number of employees on their payroll and
outsource core functions to contractors who use contingent employment
arrangements.68 The commonplace suits filed by workers for being
misclassified as contractors suggest that this phenomenon is driven
primarily by the investor-owners of the hiring firms, not by workers
themselves.

64. See James C. Sesil et al., Broad-based Employee Stock Options in U.S. ‘New
Economy’ Firms, 40 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 273, 275–78 (2002).
65. See Alexis C. Madrigal, Silicon Valley’s Big Three vs. Detroit’s Golden-Age Big
Three, THE ATLANTIC (May 24, 2017), https://bit.ly/2qd3pBE.
66. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google’s Shadow Work Force: Temps Who
Outnumber
Full-Time
Employees,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
28,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/technology/google-tempworkers.html?searchResultPosition=2&module=inline.
67. See generally Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital
Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577 (2016).
68. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR
SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 83–87 (2014). Revisions to antitrust
laws contributed to the group of the fissured workplace in which contractors and
specialized independent firms perform the core functions of a corporation. Beginning in
the late 1970s, the relaxation of antitrust rules governing vertical restraints (between firms
in connected markets) allowed businesses, like fast food franchisors, to exercise control
over those formally outside their corporate roof, like franchisees. See generally Brian
Callaci, Vertical Restraints and the Creation of a Fissured Workplace: Evidence from
Franchise Contracts (2018).
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Harms to Society

In addition to suppressing potential rivals and diminishing worker
leverage, the combination of investor-ownership with market
concentration results in reduced opportunity throughout society. Although
stock ownership is, in principle, universally accessible, in practice such
ownership and the capital gains resulting from it are highly concentrated—
and increasingly so.69 Under such conditions, investor-owned firms with
durable market power contribute to widening wealth inequality, which in
turn can reduce the prospects for individual economic mobility.70
When combined with pervasive market power, the shareholder value
maximization ideology can also imperil long-term economic development
and prosperity. Monopoly and oligopoly power reduce companies’
incentive to develop new capacities and can make long-term investment a
losing proposition.71 Instead, the safer approach would be extracting as
much profit from existing capacity. Furthermore, shareholder-centric
management philosophy has engendered an extreme short-termism across
much of the business sector. Many companies and their managements seek
to generate as much short-term capital gains and dividends as possible.72
As a result, they often forgo investments that have longer-term payoffs.
This short-termism can have serious effects on long-term economic
growth and standards of living.73 Private equity-owned businesses
exemplify this shareholder value maximization in action. Under private
equity ownership, businesses routinely borrow substantial amounts of
69. See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States
Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q. J. ECON. 519, 530–31
(2016); Jeanna Smialek, Stock Ownership Flashes a Warning Signal for Wealth Inequality,
BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2017, 8:28 A.M.), https://bloom.bg/2rBgQeQ.
70. See Janet L. Yellen, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech
at the Conference on Economic Opportunity and Inequality: Perspectives on Inequality and
Opportunity from the Survey of Consumer Finances (Oct. 17, 2014), available at
https://bit.ly/ZHI0OS.
71. See America’s Uncompetitive Markets Harm Its Economy, ECONOMIST (July 27,
2017), https://econ.st/2WIxokb. During a strike by Verizon workers in 2015, a
commentator compared and contrasted the company’s relationship with shareholders to its
relationship with workers:
There’s a lot of attention on the Verizon strike, but less attention to Verizon’s
payouts to shareholders. Verizon did a $5 billion stock buyback last year to boost
its stock price, on top of an already generous dividend. If that money had instead
been divided among 180,000 workers, it would have come to $28,000 per person
— showing that there’s plenty of profit to be shared across the company. Or, if
it costs $500 to install FiOS in one household, that money could have been used
to help 10 million households cross the digital divide.
Mike Konczal, How the Rise of Finance Has Warped Our Values, WASH. POST (Apr. 22,
2016), https://wapo.st/315v4D7.
72. See Lazonick, supra note 28.
73. See Karen Brettell et al., The Cannibalized Company, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://reut.rs/2vo0pSJ .
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money to pay generous dividends to their owners and cripple their longterm financial viability in the process.74
Widening inequality and labor disruption are just a few of the public
harms produced by the combination of market power with investorfocused ownership designs. Investor-owned companies, for instance, have
difficulty addressing environmental considerations head-on. After
revelations that ExxonMobil executives had knowingly misled the public
on climate change for many years, shareholders had standing to sue the
company, not for ecological damage, but merely for related losses in the
value of their shares.75 Due to a series of court decisions across a range of
areas, investor-owned businesses face few constraints on their political
activities and can advance their short-term business interests at the
expense of more multifarious perceptions of the common good.76
E.

Appetite for Alternatives

Despite the prevalence of investor-owned firms in the Fortune 500,
this model of ownership faces growing protest and criticism from
commentators and in the business world itself. Some scholars perceive that
shareholder primacy is on the decline.77 Management schools that once
held this ideology as gospel have begun teaching competing notions such
as the “triple bottom line” and “social entrepreneurship.”78 Companies
have found that they can gain trust and loyalty of customers by pursuing
the relatively recent B Corp charter, which incorporates an entity as a
benefit corporation. A growing number of states are allowing B Corp
charters and legally allowing a company’s managers to prioritize social

74. See Nabila Ahmed & Sridhar Natarajan, Private Equity Wins Even When It Loses,
Thanks to Debt Markets, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2017, 5:00 A.M.),
https://bloom.bg/2ndpQnk.
75. See Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, What Exxon Mobil Didn’t Say About
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2v4LBLp.
76. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (“[T]o
exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the modern free
economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech to the public
debate.”); Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1991)
(“The federal antitrust laws also do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in
seeking anticompetitive action from the government. . . . That a private party’s political
motives are selfish is irrelevant: Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to
influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in
Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.
R.-C. L. L. REV. 423 (2016).
77. See Stout, supra note 25, at 1178–81.
78. Gerald F. Davis & Christopher White, The Traits of Socially Innovative
Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 17, 2015), https://bit.ly/1HhsdYU; see also Ana María
Peredoa & Murdith McLean, Social Entrepreneurship: A Critical Review of the Concept,
41 J. WORLD BUS. 56, 56 (2006).
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mission over profit maximization.79 Some entrepreneurs have sought to
abandon conventional corporate structures altogether with “distributed
autonomous organizations” and the like, which are enabled by the
blockchain technology underlying Bitcoin. To be sure, in many cases,
these systems have been used to merely replicate under-regulated
speculative markets.80
Part of this experimentation has been a revival of interest in
cooperative business structures. Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has
been a surge of interest in “move your money” campaigns preferring credit
unions over investor-owned banks, policy initiatives on behalf of workerowned businesses, and a phenomenon known as “platform
cooperativism”—a marriage of cooperative ownership designs with the
platform economy which has spawned conferences, startups, policy
initiatives, and more.81 While such efforts have tended to strike a utopian
chord, the cooperative model is arguably the oldest and most well-proven
form of social enterprise. The cooperative model represents a tradition that
also bears neglected significance for antitrust.
III. COOPERATIVE ADVANTAGES
A cooperative is a business or other collective owned and governed
by the people or organizations that benefit from its product, service, or
employment, rather than by outside investors seeking solely financial
return. Though it is common today to regard cooperatives as an
“alternative” kind of corporation, Henry Hansmann’s seminal study, The
Ownership of Enterprise, reverses the relation by describing the primarily
investor-owned (or “capitalist”) corporation as “the most familiar form of
producer cooperative.”82 Hansmann considers the cooperative a general
rubric of joint ownership and governance, under which capitalist
corporations are a subset that happens to grant particular privilege to
capital-contributors (as opposed to other stakeholders such as employees,
79. See Janine S. Hiller, The Benefit Corporation and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 287, 288 (2012). For an example of conflict between
investor-ownership and a cousin of B Corp incorporation, B Corp certification, see David
Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2n1PGfy.
80. See generally PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE
LAW: THE RULE OF CODE (2018).
81. See generally TREBOR SCHOLZ & NATHAN SCHNEIDER, OURS TO HACK AND TO
OWN: THE RISE OF PLATFORM COOPERATIVISM, A NEW VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF WORK
AND A FAIRER INTERNET (Trebor Scholz & Nathan Schneider eds., 2016); Nathan
Schneider, An Internet of ownership: Democratic design for the online economy, 66 SOC.
REV. 320 (2018) [hereinafter An Internet of Ownership]; NATHAN SCHNEIDER, EVERYTHING
FOR EVERYONE: THE RADICAL TRADITION THAT IS SHAPING THE NEXT ECONOMY 82–83
(2018) [hereinafter EVERYTHING FOR EVERYONE].
82. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE ix (1996).
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customers, or suppliers).83 Cooperative scholars tend to consider this an
over-simplification, since the cooperative “movement” asserts principles
and values over and above merely a shared ownership structure.84
Cooperative businesses arose in tandem with the advent of the
industrial firm. Textile mill workers in Rochdale, England founded a
customer-owned store, widely regarded as the first modern co-op in the
Anglophone world, in 1844. In the subsequent decades, this model was
replicated widely and spawned a national wholesale purchasing and
manufacturing co-op whose descendant, the Co-operative Group, remains
an important British retailer today.85 In the nineteenth century United
States, cooperatives were among the first to establish the insurance
industry (in which major firms such as State Farm and Northwestern
Mutual are still owned by their policyholders) and were instrumental in
modernizing agriculture (through joint purchasing and marketing
efforts).86 By the early twentieth century, the U.S. federal government
actively supported co-op development, especially under the purview of the
Department of Agriculture. Cooperative brands include grocery store
staples such as Land O’Lakes butter, Organic Valley milk, Ocean Spray
cranberries, and Sun-Kist oranges.87 Less visible on retail shelves, but
nonetheless significant, is CHS, a Fortune 500 farm supply and marketing
firm.88 Additionally, CoBank, a product of the Farm Credit System
established by Congress in 1916, is one of several large agricultural banks
whose member-owners are the co-ops with which they do business.89
The phenomenon of smaller businesses doing joint purchasing or
marketing through cooperative firms is by no means limited to agriculture.
Familiar examples include, for instance, hardware purchasing

83. See id.
84. See Sonja Novkovic, Defining the Cooperative Difference, 37 J. SOCIOECONOMICS 2168, 2175 (2008).
85. See JOHN F. WILSON ET AL., BUILDING CO-OPERATION: A BUSINESS HISTORY OF
THE CO-OPERATIVE GROUP, 1863–2013 (2013).
86. See generally JOHN CURL, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF COOPERATION, COOPERATIVE MOVEMENTS, AND COMMUNALISM IN AMERICA
(2012); JESSICA GORDON NEMBHARD, COLLECTIVE COURAGE: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE (2014); JOSEPH G. KNAPP,
THE RISE OF AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE: 1620–1920 (1969); EDWARD K. SPANN,
BROTHERLY TOMORROWS: MOVEMENTS FOR A COOPERATIVE SOCIETY IN AMERICA, 1820–
1920 (1989).
87. See Co-ops Commit: The 2017 NCB Co-op 100, NAT’L COOPERATIVE BANK,
https://bit.ly/31vocz5 (last visited July 15, 2019).
88. See CHS Financials and News, FORTUNE, https://bit.ly/2WCMd7S (last visited
Sep. 6, 2019).
89. See Corporate, COBANK, https://bit.ly/2XiShiV (last visited July 15, 2019).
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cooperatives such as Ace and, until recently, True Value.90 These co-ops
have helped ensure the survival of many locally owned hardware stores,
which in turn are member-owners of the co-ops.91 Some retail franchises,
such as Dairy Queen and Best Western, have co-ops built into their
franchise structures.92
Cooperatives with individual consumers as members have also
created sustainable enterprises and achieved economies of scale. During
the interwar years, farmers lacking access to electricity began to form their
own electric utility co-ops. In 1936 the Rural Electrification Act granted
low-interest federal loans and technical assistance that spurred the creation
of what are now nearly 900 such utilities, which provide power for more
than half of the United States landmass and increasingly offer broadband
internet as well.93 Meanwhile, department store mogul Edward Filene
coined the term “credit union” for customer-owned, co-op retail banking
and he advocated for the passage of enabling legislation.94 Credit unions
provide consumer-owned banking services for many millions of people,
both rural and urban, sometimes out-competing far larger banks on certain
products.95 Consumer-owned retail stores have also been essential for
developing new markets, such as for high-end sporting goods—consider
REI or Canada’s Mountain Equipment Co-operative—and the natural
foods co-ops that paved the way for the Amazon-owned giant Whole
Foods.96 Other countries have even more significant examples of retail
cooperation, such as Italy’s Coop Italia, a federation of regional consumer
cooperatives that constitutes the country’s largest grocery chain.97
Worldwide, approximately three million cooperatives reportedly
account for about 10 percent of all employment.98 A recent survey of the

90. See Lauren Zumbach, True Value Owners Approve Selling Majority Stake in
Hardware Co-op to Private Equity Firm, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 20, 2018, 12:05 P.M.),
https://bit.ly/2QBbgTz.
91. See generally William P. Darrow et al., David vs. Goliath in the Hardware
Industry: Generic Strategies and Critical Success Factors as Revealed by Business
Practice, 37 MID-ATLANTIC J. BUS. 97 (2001).
92. See, e.g., About, DQOA/DQOC, https://bit.ly/2YWPZGP (last visited July 15,
2019); see also Quist v. Best Western Int., Inc., 354 N.W.2d 656, 659 (N.D. 1984).
93. See Nathan Schneider, Economic Democracy and the Billion-Dollar Co-op, THE
NATION (May 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/2pdtwYL.
94. See generally CARROLL MOODY & GILBERT C. FITE, THE CREDIT UNION
MOVEMENT: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1850–1980 (1984).
95. See JOHN TATOM, Competitive Advantage: A Study of the Federal Tax Exemption
for Credit Unions (2006).
96. See Ruth Little et al., Collective Purchase: Moving Local and Organic Foods
beyond the Niche Market, 42 ENV’T & PLAN. A: ECON. & SPACE 1797, 1800–02 (2010).
97. See Paul W. Dobson et al., The Patterns and Implications of Increasing
Concentration in European Food Retailing, 54 J. AG. ECON. 111, 116 (2003).
98. See Facts and Figures, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, https://bit.ly/2GfUV04
(last visited July 15, 2019).
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co-op sector in the United States counted nearly 40,000 businesses
employing over 600,000 people.99 These businesses include co-ops owned
by their workers, their small-business clients, their individual customers,
and more. Some include in their ownership structure several types of
stakeholder classes. Additionally, as many as 14 million workers
participate in employee stock-ownership plans, which bear some
resemblance to cooperatives.100 Since co-ops take such different forms, it
is a flexible business structure that allows for diverse “bottom lines” in
lieu of the shareholder value that motivates typical investor-owned firms.
Research suggests a similarly diverse set of social benefits, including
contributions to community governance,101 protection against
exploitation,102 and resilience in times of economic hardship.103
Despite their advantages, cooperatives face certain challenges. In
times past, people might have pooled their resources in a co-op to
circumvent the high costs of capital, or outright barriers to capital access.
In societies where finance plays a growing role and captures a larger share
of the economy,104 the cost of investor capital for new enterprises may be
so low that democratic self-organizing is seen as expensive in comparison
to investor ownership. Although cooperative financing mechanisms are
widespread in certain sectors (such as agriculture and electric utilities)
they are almost nonexistent in others (such as software and
manufacturing). Historically, success in overcoming such barriers has
tended to come through a blend of entrepreneurship and policy support.105
Cooperatives can also struggle with costly and ineffective
governance, especially when they endure shifts in scale or member culture
that the founders failed to anticipate.106 This is one reason why co-ops
frequently depend on regional, national, and international associations to
99. See Measuring the Cooperative Economy, U. WIS. CTR. FOR COOPERATIVES,
https://mce.uwcc.wisc.edu (last visited July 15, 2019).
100. See Joseph R. Blasi et al., Having a Stake: Evidence and Implications for Broadbased Employee Stock Ownership and Profit Sharing, THIRD WAY (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2H536Oo.
101. See Andrew Zitcer & Richardson Dilworth, Grocery Cooperatives as Governing
Institutions in Neighborhood Commercial Corridors, URB. AFFAIRS REV. (June 15, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2KMJuCs.
102. See Pérotin, supra note 17, at 20.
103. See Guillermo Alves et al., Workplace democracy and job flows, 44 J. OF COMP.
ECON. 258, 263 (2016).
104. See THOMAS I. PALLEY, FINANCIALIZATION: THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE
CAPITAL DOMINATION (2013).
105. Id. at 53–56.
106. See Derek C. Jones & Panu Kalmi, Economies of Scale Versus Participation: A
Co-Operative Dilemma? J. OF ENTREPRENEURIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 37, 38
(Dec. 2012); Keith A. Taylor & Art Sherwood, Unique Expectations of Co-operative
Boards: taking on the challenges of the democratic enterprise, INT. J. OF CO-OPERATIVE
MGMT, 29, 30 (Aug. 2014).
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establish standards, best practices, and member-training regimes, as well
as to exert pressure in cases of stagnation or mismanagement.107 In
addition to such more or less voluntary associations, legal regimes have
also played a role in establishing and enforcing standards for cooperative
firms.
The International Co-operative Alliance, which represents the co-op
sector globally, maintains an official definition, seven principles and six
values, that it regards as constituting “cooperative identity,” last updated
in 1995.108 In the United States, as with other features of corporate law,
co-op incorporation statutes vary state-by-state. The United States
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) has provided a far more concise,
three-point definition:109


User-Owner Principle: Those who own and finance the
cooperative are those who use the cooperative.



User-Control Principle: Those who control the cooperative are
those who use the cooperative.



User-Benefits Principle: The cooperative’s sole purpose is to
provide and distribute benefits to its users on the basis of their use.

The “user” in question can be a consumer, farmer, worker, another
co-op, or another kind of business. Although many co-ops overseen by the
USDA have become increasingly consolidated,110 these principles
nevertheless amount to a kind of ownership design quite distinct from
ownership by investors seeking only higher share prices and dividends.
This distinctiveness can have consequences for antitrust policy.
The 1922 Capper-Volstead Act, sometimes known as the “Magna
Carta of cooperatives,” provided farmers with some protection from
antitrust laws that might otherwise target their co-ops.111 According to its
sponsor, Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas, the act’s purpose was “to give
to the farmer the same right to bargain collectively that [was]already
107. See generally Antonio Fici, Cooperation among Cooperatives in Italian and
Comparative Law, 4 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL & ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 64 (2015).
108. See Co-operative Identity, Values & Principles, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE,
https://bit.ly/10eJZLu (last visited May 28, 2019) (“Cooperatives are based on the values
of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity. In the tradition
of their founders, cooperative members believe in the ethical values of honesty, openness,
social responsibility and caring for others.”).
109. See BRUCE J. REYNOLDS, COMPARING COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLES OF THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE ALLIANCE 2 (U.S.
Dep’t of Agric. ed. 2014).
110. See Keri Jacobs, Ag cooperatives consolidating, too, 55 AgriMarketing 16–18
(April 2017), https://bit.ly/2kMwgLn.
111. Donald M. Barnes & Christopher E. Ondeck, The Capper-Volstead Act:
Opportunity Today and Tomorrow, NAT’L COUNCIL OF FARMER COOPERATIVES’ NAT’L
INST. ON COOPERATIVE EDUC., ANN. CONF. (Aug. 5, 1997), https://bit.ly/2zlDdqo.
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enjoyed by corporations.”112 This rationale reflects the assumption that,
with respect to antitrust policy, a group of small producers organizing
together in a cooperative business should be treated differently from other
kinds of corporations. This insight is no less relevant today.
A.

Economies of Scale with Less Need for Conglomeration

One significant difference between cooperatives and investor-owned
businesses lies in how they tend to achieve scale: through federation rather
than conglomeration. Large cooperatives are usually composed of, and
accountable to, smaller co-ops or other kinds of businesses. Thus, large
co-ops incline toward supporting diverse, competitive, smaller enterprises,
rather than seeking to undercut, eliminate, or absorb them. For instance,
the regional component co-ops of Coop Italia are not subsidiaries of the
national company; instead, they own it.113 Most United States electric coops do something similar. On a regional basis, they have formed larger
“generation and transmission” co-ops, owned by the smaller ones, to
undertake major capital investments like power plants and high-voltage
transmission lines.114 Nationally, electric co-ops have formed cooperatives
for shared financing and technology needs.115 Regional grocery and
agricultural co-ops likewise achieve national economies of scale through
such federations.
Although federations can create market power, they are not likely to
seek and exercise market power in the same way that investor-owned
corporations do. Accountability in a cooperative federation flows
downward, toward participant enterprises or individuals rather than to
outside investors. In some cases the constituent members are noncompetitive natural monopolies, such as the electric utility co-ops. In other
cases, cooperative arrangements enable and support member businesses
that compete with one another. Neighboring farmers, retail stores, or
service contractors may belong to the same co-op in order to achieve
economies of scale in discrete activities and, at the same time, continue
competing for employees, customers, and productivity.116 Thus,
cooperative federation can present lower risk of anticompetitive and other
unfair conduct than corporate conglomeration. Evidence also suggests that
cooperatives can reach higher rates of productivity and efficiency than

112. 62 CONG. REC. 2057 (1922).
113. See Nathan Schneider, How Communists and Catholics Built a Commonwealth,
AM. MAG. (Sept, 7, 2017), https://bit.ly/2xq4xnV.
114. EVERYTHING FOR EVERYONE, supra note 81.
115. See id.
116. The Supreme Court has, at times, helped ensure this, such as when it required
the Associated Press to open membership to competing news agencies. See generally
Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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investor-owned competitors,117 and thereby create savings that are
designed to be passed on to their members.
B.

Worker Independence with Less Vulnerability

Labor organizing and cooperatives have a long history together in the
United States. From the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries,
workers seeking rights and benefits on the job frequently combined union
strategies (such as strikes) with co-op strategies (such as forming workerowned manufacturing, insurance, housing, and retail businesses).118 For
instance, co-op stores enabled workers to obtain necessary goods at lower
prices and co-op workshops allowed workers to earn income in the case of
a strike. In addition to higher wages, shorter hours, and greater
employment stability, workers often fought for collective control of the
workplace.119 National unions such as the Knights of Labor and the
Industrial Workers of the World actively pursued cooperative
development when they were most active.120 This pattern largely ceased
after the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which regularized labor
disputes in a way that left little room for the creative alternative-building
that cooperative development represented.
In the United States and Europe, interest in co-ops has re-emerged
among workers facing greater vulnerability in the erosion of the postwar
social contract.121 Unions such as the Service Employees International
Union and United Steelworkers, among others, have pursued co-op
development.122 Some of the most promising developments, though, are
taking place among the contract workers not ordinarily served by labor
unions. Notably, SMart is a Belgian cooperative (now spreading across
Europe and beyond) that enables its tens of thousands of active members
to carry out their freelance payroll and bookkeeping as employees of the
co-op, granting them access to a more robust social safety network than
they otherwise would have.123 The New York-based Freelancers Union is
117. See Molk, supra note 17, at 912.
118. See generally JOHN CURL, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF COOPERATION, COOPERATIVE MOVEMENTS, AND COMMUNALISM IN AMERICA
(2012).
119. See DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS’ CONTROL IN AMERICA 98–100
(Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 1979).
120. See generally STEVE LEIKIN, THE PRACTICAL UTOPIANS: AMERICAN WORKERS
AND THE COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN THE GILDED AGE (2005).
121. See Pat Conaty et al., Working Together: Trade union and co-operative
innovations for precarious workers, CO-OPERATIVES UK (2018), https://bit.ly/2HOJc9q.
122. See Brian Van Slyke, Unions and Cooperatives: How Workers Can Survive and
Thrive, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 27, 2016), https://bit.ly/2JRrZS1; see also Laura Hanson
Schlachter, Stronger Together? The USW-Mondragon Union Co-op Model, 42 LAB. STUD.
J. 124, 125 (2017).
123. See SMART, What Is SMart?, https://bit.ly/31bACw2 (last visited Jun. 1, 2019).
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not a cooperative (nor a union), but it has recreated features of past workersupporting co-ops by providing access to medical insurance and other
services, together with lobbying and a smartphone app for those seeking
legal advice.124 A variety of platform cooperatives, such as the gigmarketplace Loconomics and the home-cleaning app Up & Go, have also
sought to use shared ownership as a means of taming and improving the
quality of life possible under irregular employment conditions.125
Whereas an investor-owned firm may have strong incentives to subjugate
worker well-being to opportunities for shareholder value, cooperative firms can
prioritize outcomes for workers as an end in itself—especially when the firm is a
worker-owned cooperative. In some cases, this can take the form of merely
dulling some of the more pernicious effects of less stable, predictable, and
rewarding work arrangements. But shared ownership can also enable workers to
propose and practice their own visions for the unfolding process that has come to
be called “the future of work.”

C.

Self-governance with Less Risk of Public Harm

With or without internal competition, cooperative forms of
association can mitigate other harms that arise from concentrated
corporate power. One example is in the potential for self-regulation. While
investor-owned companies carry strong incentives to prioritize (often
short-term) share value above other concerns, cooperatives’ participant
members tend to have a wider range of concerns that boards and managers
must address. This can introduce dynamism and reduce the need for
outside regulation to prevent harm to parties outside of the cooperative.
Co-op participants are more likely to feel the effects of such harms, and
seek to prevent them, than profit-seeking investors. Such self-regulation
in cooperatives has already been recognized by policymakers. Electric
utility co-ops, for instance, operate with less regulation in most states
relative to investor-owned utilities.126
Democratically owned and managed enterprises may require less
extensive public regulation than investor-owned firms, and the benefits
may outweigh the costs of more diverse stakeholder interests. In cases
such as the resilience of credit unions after the 2008 financial crisis,
cooperative governance has shown an ability to accommodate a diverse
set of priorities.127 Cooperatives can also come to operate as democratic
and complementary “governing institutions” alongside the public
124. See FREELANCERS UNION, https://freelancersunion.org (last visited Jun. 1, 2019).
125. See An Internet of ownership, supra note 81, at 325.
126. See John Farrell et al., Re-Member-ing the Cooperative Way, INST. FOR LOCAL
SELF-RELIANCE (2016), https://bit.ly/2JRutjj; Jim Cooper, Electric Co-operatives: From
New Deal to Bad Deal?, 45 HARV. J. ON LEG. 335, 373 (2008).
127. See Taylor & Sherwood, supra note 106, at 38.
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sector.128 These kinds of enterprises, when functioning properly, respond
to a wide range of community needs and concerns and enable regulators
to focus on proactive collective-action challenges.
Furthermore, through market participation, cooperative enterprise
can compete directly with investor-owned businesses and perform an
indirect, but important, regulatory function. Through this head-to-head
rivalry with corporate entities, co-ops can provide beneficial “yardstick
competition” and push prices closer to what a competitive market would
yield.129 American history reveals the value of this type of competition.
During the 1930s, the federal government’s promotion of power projects,
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, and rural electric cooperatives
provided critical competition to investor-owned utilities and yielded more
affordable electric rates.130
The governance issues facing cooperatives, however, should not be
discounted. Although electric co-op customer satisfaction is consistently
higher than for investor-owned electric companies,131 member
participation in governance is almost universally low—nearly two-thirds
of electric co-ops receive ballots from less than 10 percent of members in
board elections.132 These utilities have also faced accusations of racial
discrimination and disenfranchisement.133 Electric cooperatives are just
one example of how large, longstanding cooperatives can fall into danger
of becoming highly centralized and unresponsive to members.134 This
danger can lead to operational inefficiency, abusive labor practices, and
even outright self-dealing among managers.135
A cooperative-oriented economy will require more robust oversight
to ensure that cooperatives adhere to high standards of accountability and
are run along democratic lines. Such an economy will also demand a blend
of legislation, regulation, and voluntary associations. Some countries, like
Kenya, rely on strong national regulations to oversee cooperative

128. See, e.g., Zitcer & Dilworth, supra note 101, at 559.
129. See, e.g., Markus Hanisch et al., The Cooperative Yardstick Revisited: Panel
Evidence from the European Dairy Sectors, 11 J. AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. 151 (2013).
130. See Williams M. Emmons III, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Electric Utilities, and the
Power of Competition, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 880, 900–02 (1993).
131. See Michael W. Khan, Déjà Vu as Co-ops Lead in Satisfaction, AM.’S ELEC.
COOPERATIVES (Jul. 17, 2008), https://www.electric.coop/co-ops-lead-satisfaction-j-dpower.
132. See Farrell et al., supra note 126.
133. See EVERYTHING FOR EVERYONE, supra note 81.
134. See, e.g., Leah Douglas, How Rural America Got Milked, WASH. MONTHLY
(2018), https://bit.ly/2mQ1Rc0.
135. Id.
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behavior,136 while others, like Italy, have employed the co-ops’
associations themselves to enforce good management practices.137
D.

Network Effects with Less Need for Centralization

The capacity of cooperative models to mitigate the potential harms
of market concentration may be especially relevant in networked, internetenabled economies. Network effects create conditions that can resemble
natural monopoly in sectors ranging from social media and online retail to
operating systems and cloud services.138 Users may benefit from ubiquity,
especially when they are not directly exposed to costs such as data
surveillance and high barriers of entry for startup competitors. Cooperative
ownership models could deliver the benefits while mitigating the harms of
network effects, especially by eliminating the temptation to leverage user
data on behalf of returns for outside investors. Federation could enable
large-scale networks, while user ownership would help ensure that such
networks remain accountable to the people who contribute to them.
Forms of cooperation have already been remarkably present on the
internet, in cases such as corporations and individuals jointly producing
open-source software, or standards-setting organizations, like the World
Wide Web Consortium, that orchestrate infrastructure among a variety of
stakeholders.139 These rationales could be extended to companies
themselves. If certain core Facebook or Amazon services were
reorganized cooperatively, a startup could participate in those services as
a full partner, not as a mere client and potential competitor. Just as people
interact over email using various software and providers, competing
companies might offer access to the Facebook or Amazon networks with
a wider range of terms and options. Indeed, the internet is a federated
network of servers and clients, suggesting that federated, cooperative
business models might be especially well suited to its economies.140
In the past, political will and policy have recognized that cooperative
models merit a distinct kind of treatment under antitrust law. When co-ops
do gain market power, it will likely be exercised in a different way than
the way investor-owned firms exercise such power. At a time when
136. See generally Ndwakhulu Tshishonga & Andrew Emmanuel Okem, A Review
of the Kenyan Cooperative Movement, in THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON
COOPERATIVES, (Andrew Emmanuel Okem ed., 2016).
137. See, e.g., Fici, supra note 107, at 64; Antonio Fici, The Essential Role of Cooperative Law and Some Related Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MUTUAL, COOPERATIVE, AND CO-OWNED BUSINESS 539 (Jonathan Michie et al. eds., 2017).
138. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.
673, 691 (1996).
139. See generally MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL
POLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2010).
140. Nathan Schneider, Next, the Internet, COOPERATIVE BUS. J. 4 (2018).
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concentrated market power is a matter of growing public concern, and
public opinion is turning back to antitrust enthusiasm, the place of
cooperative models in the antitrust tradition should be part of the
conversation as well. The remainder of this Article will consider the legal
specifics of the cooperative model legacy and some opportunities for
reviving it to meet the challenges of the present.
IV. ANTITRUST LAW AND THE COOPERATIVE FORM
Antitrust law has a complicated relationship and history with
cooperatives. Certain types of cooperatives exist uneasily in today’s
antitrust landscape, while others face minimal danger from the antitrust
laws. Co-ops that seek only to enhance members’ bargaining power may
encounter serious antitrust risk. In contrast, co-ops that pool the resources
of members to engage in production, distribution, or retail activities will
not likely confront greater antitrust risks than investor-owned businesses.
Because of the serious threat antitrust poses to certain forms of
cooperatives, Congress has established discrete antitrust immunities for
cooperatives and other collectives composed of particular classes of
members.
Antitrust law today features a default rule that all market
participants—large businesses, small businesses, workers, and
consumers—are subject to the same antitrust duties and prohibitions.141
Judicial and statutory exemptions immunize certain actors from antitrust
liability.142 These exemptions, however, are the exception rather than the
rule. The Supreme Court has described the antitrust laws as embodying
the “fundamental national values of free enterprise and economic
competition.”143
Federal antitrust enforcers and courts treat horizontal collusion
between otherwise competing actors as the most serious antitrust offense.
Even as the Supreme Court has relaxed legal rules governing a range of
141. Sanjukta Paul has described antitrust law’s choice to treat a corporation—a
collective composed sometimes of tens of thousands of workers and billions in assets—as
a single entity as the “firm exemption.” Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of
Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
142. See, e.g., Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 539–40 (1983) (“Federal policy has since developed not only a
broad labor exemption from the antitrust laws, but also a separate body of labor law
specifically designed to protect and encourage the organizational and representational
activities of labor unions.”); Square D. Co. v. Niagara Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409,
422 (1986) (affirming the principle that rates filed with a regulatory body cannot be
challenged through treble damage lawsuits); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972)
(affirming judicially-created antitrust exemption for baseball in light of congressional
inaction).
143. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 225
(2013).
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competitively suspect business conduct,144 the Court continues to treat
collusion as per se illegal, condemning it as “the supreme evil of
antitrust.”145 The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) devotes the
bulk of its enforcement resources to prosecuting individuals and
businesses for price-fixing, market division, and other types of “naked
collusion.”146 Each year, the DOJ obtains prison sentences for numerous
individuals for cartel activity and collects hundreds of millions of dollars
in fines.147 Antitrust enforcers subscribe to a bipartisan consensus that
rooting out collusion should be the most important priority for public
antitrust.148
The vehicle through which collusion takes place—whether a
specially created corporation or something more informal—cannot
redeem an otherwise illegal price-fixing arrangement.149 The courts have
long held that “an otherwise naked [and per se illegal] trade restraint
cannot be made legal just by incorporating it.”150 Drawing on this
precedent, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborators Among Competitors,
from the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), have affirmed
that they likely will challenge joint action without economic integration as
per se illegal conduct.151
144. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007) (overruling the nearly century-old per se prohibition on resale price maintenance
and holding this practice should be evaluated under the rule of reason); Brooke Grp. Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 (1993) (holding that
predatory pricing claim requires showing of both below-cost pricing and dangerous
probability of recoupment of below-cost pricing).
145. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004).
146. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD STATISTICS (FY 2008-2017
5–7), https://bit.ly/2WicgBZ.
147. See Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Enforcement Trends Charts,
https://bit.ly/2EPmIGe (last visited Sep. 18, 2019).
148. See, e.g., Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div.,
Prosecuting Antitrust Crimes, Address at Georgetown University Law Center Global
Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 10, 2014), https://bit.ly/2UvHTCy; Thomas O.
Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Perspectives on Cartel
Enforcement in the United States and Brazil, Address at the Universidade de São Paolo
(Apr. 28, 2008), https://bit.ly/2wyRw9I .
149. See Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945) (“[A]rrangements or
combinations designed to stifle competition cannot be immunized by adopting a
membership device accomplishing that purpose.”); Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football
League, 560 U.S. 183, 191 (2010) (“[W]e have repeatedly found instances in which
members of a legally single entity violated § 1 when the entity was controlled by a group
of competitors and served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.”).
150. Chris Sagers, Why Copperweld Was Actually Kind of Dumb: Sound, Fury and
the Once and Still Missing Antitrust Theory of the Firm, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 377,
387 (2011).
151. The antitrust agencies have stated the following:
The mere coordination of decisions on output is not integration . . . . Th[is]
agreement is of a type so likely to harm competition and to have no significant
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Co-op Accommodations in Antitrust Law

Since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, Congress and the
courts have made multiple efforts to accommodate cooperatives. Through
the Clayton Act in 1914 and Capper-Volstead Act in 1922, Congress
established antitrust exemptions for agricultural cooperatives. With the
Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1933, Congress sought to
protect the activities of labor unions from antitrust challenge.
1.

Protection for Agricultural Cooperatives

In the early decades of the Sherman Act, agricultural cooperatives
confronted a real risk of antitrust prosecutions. This was ironic: farmers
and their associations were among the earliest victims of the trusts and
became principal promoters of federal antitrust law.152 As organizations
that sought to build the collective power of individual farmers,
cooperatives and their members feared that they and their activities would
be condemned as illegal restraints of trade under the Sherman Act.153
Indeed, several state courts held that cooperatives were illegal under their
antitrust laws. For instance, in 1913, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
a cooperative of hog farmers violated the state’s law prohibiting price
fixing.154 Additionally, milk dealers repeatedly brought antitrust suits
against dairy cooperatives, alleging illegal restraints of trade.155 These
antitrust actions and decisions posed a serious threat to the ongoing
existence and activities of cooperatives.
Due to the concerns of farmers and their cooperatives, Congress
established an antitrust immunity for agricultural cooperatives. The
Clayton Act provided immunity for certain types of agricultural
cooperatives. The relevant section of the Clayton Act provides that
“[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
benefits that particularized inquiry into its competitive effect is deemed by the
antitrust laws not to be worth the time and expense that would be required.
Consequently, the evaluating Agency likely would conclude that th[is type of]
agreement is per se illegal.
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.2 (2000) [hereinafter COMPETITOR
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES].
152. Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust: A New Direction for Agricultural
Law, 85 N.D. L. REV. 449, 450–53 (1999); Gary D. Libecap, The Rise of the Chicago
Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Anti-trust, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 242, 256
(1992).
153. John E. Noakes, Agricultural Cooperatives, 33 ANTITRUST L.J. 7, 8 (1967).
154. See Reeves v. Decorah Farmers’ Coop. Soc’y, 140 N.W. 844 (Iowa 1913). The
Illinois Supreme Court also held cooperative selling activity violated state antitrust law.
Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers’ Ass’n, 39 N.E. 651 (Ill. 1895).
155. See JOSEPH G. KNAPP, CAPPER-VOLSTEAD IMPACT ON COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE
4 (1975).
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existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having
capital stock or conducted for profit[.]”156A sponsor of the bill in the House
described this exemption as making express what had been implicit until
then: antitrust laws were not intended to apply to farmers’ cooperatives.157
Examining the legislative record of the Sherman Act, Senator Hollis said
that “[a]t that time no one imagined that labor unions or farmers’
associations would come within the act. No abuses from such
organizations challenged attention.”158 This exemption notably excluded
cooperatives with capital stock and thereby did not immunize the largest
segment of agricultural cooperatives at the time the act was being
debated.159
The Capper-Volstead Act, enacted in the midst of a serious
agricultural depression, built on and broadened the Clayton Act’s
immunity for cooperatives.160 This statute expanded the immunity to cover
cooperatives with capital stock and established criteria for qualifying
cooperatives. To be eligible for the Capper-Volstead immunity, a co-op
must comprise producers of agricultural products, such as “farmers,
planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers,” and “collectively
process[], prepar[e] for market, handl[e], and market[] in interstate and
foreign commerce, such products of persons so engaged.”161 Furthermore,
a qualifying co-op must either limit all members to no more than one vote
or cap dividends on stock or membership capital at 8 percent per year, and
must not handle, by value, more non-member products than member
products.162 Recognizing that these cooperatives could raise the price of
agricultural products to the detriment of consumers, the Capper-Volstead
Act granted the USDA the authority to investigate and obtain cease-anddesist orders against cooperatives that engaged in conduct, such as
monopolization and restraints of trade, that “unduly enhanced” the price
of an agricultural product.163 Subsequently, in 1934, Congress created an
antitrust immunity, structured like the Capper-Volstead Act, to cover
cooperatives composed of fishers.164
156. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2018 & Supp. 2017) (emphasis added).
157. See 51 CONG. REC. 9540–41 (1914) (statement of Rep. Henry).
158. Id. at 13967.
159. See KNAPP, supra note 155, at 4.
160. For background on the political currents and debate leading up to the passage of
the Capper-Volstead Act, see id. at 4–11; Lauck, supra note 152, at 491–93.
161. 7 U.S.C. § 291.
162. Id.
163. 7 U.S.C. § 292.
164. 15 U.S.C. §§ 521–22. Importantly, the Supreme Court held in 1926 that the
federal government and states could enact laws to support the growth of cooperative
enterprise, without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Liberty Warehouse
Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers’ Coop. Mktg. Ass’n, 276 U.S. 71 (1928).
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The Capper-Volstead Act was described as a means of granting
farmers the freedom to build power in the marketplace. Representative
Volstead held that the new law would allow farmers to combine just as
“[b]usiness men can combine by putting their money into corporations.”165
Senator Capper stated that the statute would allow farmers to “bargain
collectively” so as to enjoy the privileges that corporations already
possessed.166 Several members of Congress predicted that farmers, using
the cooperative form, would be able to integrate into processing of
agricultural goods and reduce the markups imposed by corporate
processors, thereby benefiting the general public too.167
The Supreme Court has articulated the bounds of the CapperVolstead immunity. The Court has held that cooperatives must be
comprised entirely of producers to be entitled to the immunity.168 The
presence of even one non-producer, such as a non-integrated agricultural
processor, deprives a cooperative of the Capper-Volstead immunity.
Although the Capper-Volstead Act creates a special USDA price oversight
process, the Court has held that this system supplements rather than
displaces the primary antitrust statutes.169 Certain forms of cooperative
behavior are not immunized under Capper-Volstead. Agreements between
a cooperative and a non-cooperative, including a cooperative’s acquisition
of a non-cooperative firm,170 or between a cooperative and a non-producer
are not immune from the antitrust laws.171 Furthermore, cooperatives can
be held liable for predatory and other unfair conduct that hurts competitors
and consumers.172 In recent years, lower courts have held that cooperative
conduct and rules that directly regulate production are also not immune
from antitrust challenge. For instance, courts have held that efforts to

165. 61 CONG. REC. 1033 (1921).
166. 62 CONG. REC. 2057 (1922).
167. See id. at 2049 (statement of Sen. Kellogg); id. at 2059 (statement of Sen.
Capper); id. at 2259, 2275 (statement of Sen. Norris).
168. See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 394–95 (1967);
Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827–28 (1978).
169. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 205–06 (1939); see also Sunkist
Growers, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 464 F. Supp. 302, 310–11 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
170. See Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 472
(1960). A few courts have held that voluntary mergers between cooperatives are
immunized under the Capper-Volstead Act. See Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc.,
635 F.2d 1037, 1045 (2d Cir. 1980); Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1182
(8th Cir. 1982).
171. See Borden, 308 U.S. at 204–05.
172. See Md. & Va. Milk Producers, 362 U.S. at 468.
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directly regulate the production of mushrooms173 and potatoes174 were
outside the scope of the Capper-Volstead immunity.175
2.

Partial Antitrust Exemption for Collective Action by
Workers

Even more so than agricultural cooperatives, unions and concerted
activity among workers faced grave threats from the federal antitrust laws
at the turn of the twentieth century. These precedents are newly relevant
at a time when union and cooperative strategies are once again blending,
especially among freelance and contract workers.176 Although the
principal congressional drafters of the Sherman Act did not intend for it to
apply to worker organizing,177 the federal government and employers
frequently used the new law to target workers when they exercised their
power.178 Federal prosecutions under the Sherman Act targeted labor as
often as capital in the early years.179 Employers and supportive federal
administrations viewed the Sherman Act as an important weapon against
secondary boycotts and strikes.180 Through these methods, workers and
their unions sought to apply pressure on parties that conducted business
with companies that resisted unionization of the workplace.181 In 1908, the
Supreme Court held that workers and their unions could be liable for
damages to businesses from secondary boycotts and strikes.182
In 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act and established an express
antitrust exemption for labor unions, as well as farmer cooperatives. The
exemption reads:

173. See In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 274, 291
(E.D. Pa. 2009).
174. See In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1157
(D. Idaho 2011).
175. See generally Alison Peck, The Cost of Cutting Agricultural Output:
Interpreting the Capper-Volstead Act, 80 MO. L. REV. 451 (2015).
176. See, e.g., Vic Vaiana, Disrupting Uber, JACOBIN (July 31, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2aXpYPS (describing ridesharing drivers’ efforts to improve working
conditions and terms of work and develop cooperatively owned alternatives to Uber).
177. See Joseph L. Greenslade, Labor Unions and the Sherman Act: Rethinking
Labor’s Nonstatutory Exemption, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 151, 155–56 (1988).
178. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 95–96 (1989). See, e.g., United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated
Council, 54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893).
179. See William Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act: Early
Administration, 68 YALE L.J. 464 (1959).
180. Secondary actions involve boycotting and striking companies that do business
with a firm subject to a labor dispute. See Robert M. Schwartz, Secondary Targets Can Be
Union’s Primary Focus, LABOR NOTES (June 20, 2012), https://bit.ly/2Z83pQt.
181. See DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO
CORPORATE LIBERALISM 71–72 (1995).
182. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 308–09 (1908).
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The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor . . . organizations . . . nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust
laws.183

Several sponsors of the bill in Congress championed the exemption
as a means of undoing a judicial misinterpretation of the Sherman Act and
establishing clear protection for workers. Representative Quinn, reviewing
the legislative history of the Sherman Act, asserted that “[t]he whole
record shows that the great lawyers of that Congress never dreamed of
such an outrage as the Sherman antitrust law being construed by the courts
so as to affect the farmers and labor organizations of this country.”184 With
the new exemption, the sponsors of the Clayton Act believed that the
courts would no longer be able to use antitrust law to police the activities
of workers and to aid employers in labor disputes.185 Notwithstanding
Congress’s intent, the courts continued to apply the Sherman Act to the
activities of labor and did so until the New Deal’s overhaul of labor market
regulations in the 1930s.186 Only after Congress passed the NorrisLaGuardia Act in the midst of the Great Depression, did the Supreme
Court grant labor the ability to act with broad freedom from antitrust
interference.187
Congress’s serial efforts to protect labor have created important
protections for a subset of American workers. Labor unions and other
worker collectives, composed of workers classified as employees under
federal law, enjoy broad latitude to act to advance their members’ interests.
Not all workers can avail themselves of the antitrust immunity, because of
how the courts have interpreted the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 17.
184. 51 CONG. REC. 9546 (1914) (statement of Rep. Quinn).
185. See generally Louis B. Boudin, Organized Labor and the Clayton Act: Part II,
29 VA. L. REV. 395 (1943).
186. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 478 (1921).
William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 188 (2001).
187. This landmark statute did not speak specifically about the Sherman Act or other
antitrust laws. Rather, it deprives the federal courts of equity jurisdiction in labor disputes.
29 U.S.C. § 101 (2012 & Supp. 2017). A 1940 Supreme Court decision explained the
relationship between antitrust and labor organizing in the wake of New Deal reforms.
Federal legislation aimed at protecting and favoring labor organizations and
eliminating the competition of employers and employees based on labor
conditions regarded as substandard, through the establishment of industry-wide
standards both by collective bargaining and by legislation setting up minimum
wage and hour standards, supports the conclusion that Congress does not regard
the effects upon competition from such combinations and standards as against
public policy or condemned by the Sherman Act.
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 504 n.24 (1940)
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The antitrust exemption for the collective action of workers applies only
to workers who are classified as employees under federal labor law.188
The crabbed judicial interpretation of the labor exemption189 creates
a real threat to many workers who seek to organize. Workers who are
classified, or misclassified,190 as independent contractors are not protected
from the antitrust laws, and employers today classify a growing number of
workers as independent contractors.191 Due to the real risk of antitrust
investigations and litigation,192 independent contractors may be deterred
from organizing and, if they seek to organize, be sued by the federal
government or employers.193
B.

How Current Antitrust Doctrine Impedes Certain
Cooperative Forms and Not Others

Antitrust law, as currently interpreted, presents serious legal risks to
certain cooperative activities and forms. Cooperatives and other
collectives that only seek to aggregate the power of individual members
(whether consumers, workers, or small firms) and do not engage in any
188. See, e.g., Taylor v. Local No.7, Int’l Union of Journeymen Horseshoers, 353
F.2d 593, 597 (4th Cir. 1965); Spence v. Se. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 1007,
1012–13 (D. Alaska 1990). The Supreme Court also declined to extend the labor exemption
to cover fishers who were in a position similar to workers but were formally independent
entrepreneurs. Columbia River Packers Assn., Inc. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1940).
For an interesting intersection between antitrust law and small producer cooperation, see
the Department of Justice’s enforcement action against Maine lobstermen over their
collective effort to raise prices in the 1950s following the Great Lobster War. United States
v. Me. Lobstermen’s Ass’n, 160 F. Supp. 115, 116 (D. Me. 1957); Michael L. O’Brien,
Mayday, Mayday: Maine’s Lobstermen Need Exemption from Federal Antitrust Laws, 19
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 145, 147-51 (2014).
189. See generally Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability
for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969 (2016).
190. See Danny Vinik, The Real Future of Work, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://politi.co/2EUSHTP (“[S]tate-level audits indicate that about 10 percent to 30
percent of American workers are currently misclassified. There are also some indications
that misclassification is becoming more widespread.”).
191. See Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative
Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015, 71 ILR REV. 382 (finding that “the
percentage of workers engaged in alternative work arrangements—defined as temporary
help agency workers, on-call workers, contract company workers, and independent
contractors or freelancers—rose from 10.7 [percent] in February 2005 to . . . 15.8 [percent]
in late 2015” and all of the net employment growth in the U.S. economy between 2005 and
2015 happened in these alternative work arrangements).
192. See supra Section IV.A.1.
193. Consider the port truck drivers’ efforts to organize:
The counsel to the [drivers’] campaign noted that the campaign was extremely
cautious about worker collective action on antitrust grounds in its early years,
observing: Apart from the merits and whether damages were recovered, the sheer
cost of defending such an action would have been sufficient to shut the campaign
down.
Paul, supra note 189, at 982.
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integrated activity face significant antitrust obstacles. Federal antitrust
agencies and courts have condemned this exercise of collective power as
an illegal restraint of trade. In contrast, cooperatives that engage in more
than collective bargaining and operate as integrated firms in production,
distribution, or retail face much less antitrust risk. Indeed, their risk of
antitrust liability is comparable to that faced by investor-owned firms.
1.

Bargaining Cooperatives

Because of its formalistic refusal to differentiate between economic
actors and almost single-minded fixation on collusion, the contemporary
antitrust regime is suspicious of joint action between independent
economic actors, large and small alike. Collusion is collusion, whether it
is done by an international cartel seeking to profit off consumers or small
producers aiming to build power against a monopsony buyer.194 This
enforcement philosophy results in “a bias against Lilliputians” and
antitrust hostility against relatively powerless actors.195 In contrast to large
businesses, consumers, small businesses, and workers can generally
exercise power only through collective action.196 Notwithstanding their
lack of power in the economy, workers or small suppliers seeking to build
bargaining power vis-à-vis a powerful purchaser are treated as engaging
in collusion.
By bringing together consumers, farmers, small businesses, or
workers, bargaining cooperatives seek to exercise the collective power of
their members to obtain better terms of trade. Depending on their
membership, bargaining co-ops try to obtain higher wages for workers,
higher prices for small suppliers, or more affordable goods and services
for consumers. In the jargon of the antitrust agencies, bargaining co-ops
seek to “coordinate decisions on price [and] output.”197 The antitrust
agencies’ activities against cooperative bargaining among independent
workers are instructive on how they treat cooperation between small
players.
In recent years, a range of professions, small firms, and their
associations have faced the wrath of federal antitrust law. The FTC has

194. See Geoffrey Green, Unflattering Resemblance, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 13,
2015, 1:18 P.M.), https://bit.ly/2XkESH7.
195. See generally Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against
Lilliputians: Small Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power,
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195 (2000). Lilliputians are the diminutive residents of the island nation
of Lilliput in Gulliver’s Travels. See generally JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS
(1726).
196. See Grimes, supra note 195, at 206.
197. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG
COMPETITORS § 3.2 (2000).
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brought cases against associations of ice-skating coaches,198 music
teachers,199 and organists200 for acting collectively to restrict head-to-head
competition and raise their incomes. In one of the more notorious uses of
antitrust law, the Reagan-era FTC sued public defenders in Washington,
D.C. because they collectively refused to represent indigent defendants
until the city raised their meager hourly rates.201 In a similar spirit, the FTC
has brought many cases against doctors for bargaining collectively,202
including against an association of independent doctors in North Texas for
bargaining collectively with private insurers.203 In upholding the FTC’s
ruling against the doctors, a federal court condemned the doctors’ group
for “using collective bargaining power to demand higher fees for
physicians who were already under contract at a lower fee.”204
Federal antitrust agencies have also advocated against collective
bargaining rights for small players in the economy. In November 2017, the
DOJ and FTC filed a brief in support of the Chamber of Commerce in its
lawsuit challenging the City of Seattle’s ordinance granting collective
bargaining rights to Uber and cab drivers.205 This antitrust hostility toward
the powerless is not aberrant. For example, in 2008, the FTC criticized and
opposed an Ohio executive order that would grant collective bargaining
rights to underpaid, overworked206 home health aides.207
198. See In re Prof’l Skaters Ass’n, No. C-4509, 2015 FTC LEXIS 46 (F.T.C. Feb.
13, 2015).
199. See In re Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, No. C-4448, 2014 FTC LEXIS 68 (F.T.C.
Apr. 3, 2014); In re Nat’l Ass’n of Teachers of Singing, Inc., No. C-4491, 2014 FTC LEXIS
218 (F.T.C. Oct. 1, 2014).
200. See In re Am. Guild of Organists, No. C-4617, 2017 FTC LEXIS 76 (F.T.C.
May 26, 2017).
201. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Ct. Trial Law. Ass’n., 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
202. See In re Praxedes E. Alvarez Santiago, 2013 FTC LEXIS 66; In re M. Catherine
Higgins, 149 F.T.C. 1114 (2010); In re Conn. Chiropractic Ass’n, 2008 FTC LEXIS 44; In
re Me. Health Alliance, 136 F.T.C. 616 (2003).
203. See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 528 F.3d 346, 352 (5th
Cir. 2008).
204. Id. at 369. In addition to the federal antitrust agencies, employers have also used
antitrust laws in attempts to defeat the organizing of independent contractors. E.g., Michael
Paulson, Theater Producers Accuse Casting Directors of Forming Illegal Cartel, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2W3D2Jx.
205. See Brief for The United States & Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant, Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. City of Seattle, 2018
U.S. App. LEXIS 19395 (9th Cir.) (No. 17-35640), 2017 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 737;
see also Marshall Steinbaum, The Feds Side Against Alt-Labor, NEXT NEW DEAL: THE
BLOG OF THE ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (Nov. 16, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/fedsside-against-alt-labor/.
206. See Vann R. Newkirk II, The Forgotten Providers, ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2WhDR68.
207. See Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Michael R. Baye & Jeffrey Schmidt,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, to William J. Seitz, Ohio Senate 4–5 (Feb. 14, 2008),
https://bit.ly/2WHjKy0.
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In the current antitrust environment, bargaining cooperatives exist, at
best, uneasily. The federal antitrust agencies, the FTC, in particular, have
sued associations of professionals and other independent workers for
engaging in collective bargaining and adopting restraints on direct price
competition. Under current antitrust law, bargaining cooperatives are
suspect and may even be condemned as per se illegal. Indeed, prevailing
antitrust policy represents an existential threat to the core mission of
bargaining co-ops to aggregate, permitting them to exist so long as they
do not exercise the collective power of their individual members. In other
words, antitrust law tolerates bargaining cooperatives that do not bargain
cooperatively. As a result, organizations like the Freelancers Union208 in
the United States and SMart209 in Europe, which have hundreds of
thousands of members between them, would face significant constraints
on their ability to advocate collectively for a class of independent workers.
In an economy in which independent workers represent a significant share
of the workforce, it is essential that independent workers have the ability
to establish collective organizations and build collective voice.
2.

Production, Distribution, and Retail Cooperatives

Cooperatives that bring together participants to develop jointly
owned production, distribution, or retail services face much lower antitrust
risk and are likely to be treated like investor-owned businesses. Antitrust
doctrine has long recognized that integration of production activities can
create economies of scale and other efficiencies.210 In recent decades, the
federal antitrust agencies and courts have further relaxed antitrust rules to
encourage this type of collaboration among businesses.211 The Competitor
Collaboration Guidelines state that “collaboration may facilitate the
attainment of scale or scope economies beyond the reach of any single
participant.”212 Accordingly, the DOJ and FTC state that they will
generally examine these types of collaborations and the associated
restraints under the fact-specific rule of reason, rather than deem them per
se illegal.213 The Supreme Court has held that collaboration between rivals
can yield new products or services that no individual party may be able to

208. See FREELANCERS UNION, https://freelancersunion.org (last visited Sep. 6,
2019).
209. See What Is SMart?, http://smartbe.be/media/uploads/2015/07/What-isSMart.pdf (last visited Sep. 6, 2019).
210. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“[S]ome
of the results of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial to consumers.”).
211. See, e.g., Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 151, at § 2.1.; United
States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F. 2d 981, 990–91 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
212. Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 151, at § 2.1.
213. See id. at § 3.2.
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offer.214 In the case Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, the Supreme Court addressed
whether price setting by an oil refining joint venture between Shell and
Texaco was per se illegal.215 The Court held that the pricing decisions of
an integrated joint venture between rivals are not per se illegal and should
be evaluated under the rule of reason.216
In light of agency guidance and legal precedents, production,
distribution, and retail cooperatives are likely to receive much more
favorable antitrust treatment than bargaining cooperatives. A cooperative
that unites competing farmers or workers to create production facilities
that would otherwise not exist is beneficial, per the prevailing
interpretation of antitrust law.217 In contrast to bargaining cooperatives, the
mere existence of such a production cooperative would not be a per se
violation of antitrust law. Antitrust law would treat this cooperative in the
same way it treats an investor-owned corporation. The cooperative would
be presumptively legal under antitrust law and could engage in a range of
business conduct. A production cooperative, however, would not be
permitted to engage in collusive or exclusionary practices, nor undertake
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions.218
Over the past 80 years, the Supreme Court has noted the economic
benefits of the integrated cooperative form. In the 1945 case, Associated
Press v. United States,219 the Court evaluated the cooperative wire
service’s restrictions on the admission of new member-newspapers and the
distribution of news reports to non-member newspapers.220 The Court
recognized that AP could collect and distribute a breadth and depth of
news stories that no single newspaper could hope to match.221 In other
words, AP, as a cooperative, pooled the resources of hundreds of
newspapers to create a product—comprehensive domestic and
international news reporting—that otherwise would not exist.
While appreciating the benefits of the cooperative venture, the Court
found that AP’s restrictive membership policies amounted to the “erection
of obstacles to the acquisition of membership . . . [, which made] it
difficult, if not impossible, for non-members to get any of the news
214. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 & 23
(1979).
215. See generally Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
216. See id. at 7.
217. Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 151, at § 2.1.
218. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009);
United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 349–50 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
219. See generally Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
220. See id. at 4–5.
221. See id. at 18 (“[T]he District Court’s unchallenged finding was that ‘AP is a vast,
intricately reticulated organization, the largest of its kind, gathering news from all over the
world, the chief single source of news for the American press, universally agreed to be of
great consequence.’”).
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furnished by AP or any of the individual members of this combination of
American newspaper publishers.”222 Given the importance of AP wire
reports to all newspapers, the Court held that these restrictions were
anticompetitive.223 The Court, in effect, imposed a non-discrimination
duty on a cooperatively-created “essential facility.”224 Intentionally or not,
the decision also brought AP into more complete compliance with the
International Co-operative Alliance principle of “open membership.”225
In 1972, the Court again recognized the productive advantages of the
cooperative form. In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,226 the Court
evaluated the legality of the food purchasing cooperative’s restrictions on
where members could sell Topco brands.227 The Court held that the selling
restraints were per se illegal.228 Although the Court invalidated the
particular contracts at issue, it recognized the competitive benefits of the
cooperative. According to the Court, the development of Topco private
label brands had strengthened the competitive position of its members,
mostly small and medium-sized grocery stores.229 The Court found that
though “only 10% of the total goods sold by Topco members bear the
association’s brand names, the profit on these goods [was] substantial and
their very existence has improved the competitive potential of Topco
members with respect to other large and powerful chains.”230
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co.,231 the Court resolved whether a small purchasing
cooperative’s decision to expel a member is a per se illegal group
boycott.232 The Court noted the advantages of the cooperative, stating that
it “permits the participating retailers to achieve economies of scale in both
the purchase and warehousing of wholesale supplies, and also ensures
ready access to a stock of goods that might otherwise be unavailable on
short notice.”233 The cooperative allowed the small retailers, who were its
members, “to compete more effectively with larger retailers.”234 Because

222. Id. at 9.
223. See id. at 18–19.
224. See Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and “Essential Facilities”: From Terminal
Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557, 569–70 (2009).
225. JONATHAN SILBERSTEIN-LOEB, THE INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS:
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, PRESS ASSOCIATION, AND REUTERS, 1848–1947 (2014).
226. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
227. See id. at 602–03.
228. See id. at 612.
229. See id. at 600.
230. Id.
231. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985).
232. See id. at 285–86.
233. Id. at 295.
234. Id.
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the cooperative lacked market power or “exclusive access to an element
essential to effective competition,” the Court held that the cooperative’s
membership policies and decisions should be examined under the rule of
reason.235
The DOJ, the FTC, and the Supreme Court have seen the economic
advantages of the cooperative form. In their guidelines on Competitor
Collaborations, the DOJ and the FTC have stated that economic
collaboration can create public benefits and that the antitrust laws should
permit such joint activity. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has
observed that cooperatives can allow independent economic actors to
come together and carry out functions that are beyond the capacity of any
single member. At the same time, the Court has applied traditional antitrust
doctrines to cooperatives to ensure that they cannot use their power to the
detriment of consumers and competitors.
V. HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATES CAN PROTECT AND
ENCOURAGE THE GROWTH OF COOPERATIVE BUSINESSES
Even though antitrust law offers significant scope for certain forms
of cooperatives to exist and thrive, Congress, the courts, the federal
antitrust agencies, and the states can take several steps to protect and
encourage all types of cooperative entities. Cooperatives can allow
ordinary Americans to build power and take control of their economic and
political lives—control that is especially lacking at a time of staggering
income and wealth inequality and high concentration across the
economy.236 Under the present interpretation of the antitrust laws,
cooperatives face a range of antitrust risks, ranging from minimal to
significant. Integrated cooperatives that combine the economic resources
of many consumers, producers, and workers are likely to receive the same
antitrust treatment that investor-owned businesses do. By way of example,
an electric distribution cooperative owned by residents of a rural area can
almost certainly exist and operate without antitrust interference and be
entitled to rule of reason treatment in the event of antitrust litigation. In
contrast, cooperatives that are created solely to build the bargaining power
of members, such as consumers or small suppliers, vis-à-vis more
powerful economic actors are more likely to face significant antitrust risks.
Indeed, prevailing antitrust precedent may even condemn these
cooperatives as per se illegal.

235. Id. at 296.
236. See Council of Econ. Advisors, Benefits of Competition and Indicators of
Market Power 7 (Apr. 2016), https://bit.ly/2zeysNg; Brett Ryder, Riding the Wave,
ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 2013), https://econ.st/2KwPO0J.
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Although the antitrust threat may appear to be confined to bargaining
cooperatives, antitrust law is likely to impede the creation of new
cooperatives in general. Many prospective distribution or production
cooperatives may have to start as bargaining collectives. Given the
challenges of establishing a cooperative enterprise, the creation of a
bargaining cooperative may be a necessary first step on the path to
building an integrated business.237 Over time, the bargaining cooperative
can acquire the resources and organizational cohesion necessary to
establish production or distribution operations. For instance, the economist
Richard Wolff has described the transformative potential of labor unions
as, “a training ground, an experiential school, to teach working people how
and why a worker co-op is the logical end of the whole process.”238 In
other words, building cooperative power is often a necessary first step and
precondition to building a cooperative firm. Recognizing this dynamic
feature of cooperative formation and growth underscores the antitrust
threat. By condemning joint bargaining activity as “price fixing,” antitrust
law may stifle the formation of not just bargaining cooperatives, but
ultimately new distribution and production cooperatives, too.
The federal government and the states can take important steps to
protect and promote the cooperative form. They should address the
existential threat posed by antitrust to certain cooperatives and place them,
regardless of their purpose, on a level footing with investor-owned
corporations. Indeed, in light of their socially desirable ownership
structure cooperative enterprises should, in general, receive more
favorable antitrust treatment than their investor-owned counterparts. At a
minimum, federal and state governments should reform the scope and
enforcement of antitrust law to provide legal protection for cooperatives
of all forms and encourage the growth of this socially desirable business
form.

237. The historical development of some farm co-ops is illustrative:
[USDA cooperative expert C.E.] Bassett favored the use of a joint buying
group—which “handles no money . . ., extends no credit, and orders no goods
except for cash in the bank’ as the ‘safest and most economical” purchasing plan.
However, he recognized that such groups should acquire warehouses when the
business grew large enough to warrant it. In such cases he favored selling
supplies at regular retail prices and dividing savings according to patronage at
the end of the year. But he urged caution in moving forward. “As the child learns
to walk before it runs, so a community should be satisfied to begin working
together in the simplest ways and should undertake more elaborate plans only as
their cooperative strength and confidence is developed.”
KNAPP, supra note 86, at 321.
238. Richard W. Briefly, Richard Wolff on Unions and Worker Co-ops, YOUTUBE
(Dec. 2, 2017), https://bit.ly/314x1Qi.
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Congress: Expand and Refine Capper-Volstead Exemption
to Cover Cooperatives Outside Agriculture

The Capper-Volstead Act offers a model on which to build legislation
to protect and encourage the growth of the cooperative form. The Act
grants farmers the freedom to band together to engage in collective
bargaining, processing, distribution, and marketing. The sponsors of the
law recognized that farmers needed freedom to act in concert to build
power against dominant corporate actors and engage in economic activity
on democratic lines.239 Congress should extend this core principle to all
cooperatives. Antitrust law, at present, serves as a major obstacle to
collective activity between independent economic actors, like workers
classified as independent contractors and consumers. Consumers, small
firms, or workers who band together to build leverage against powerful
corporate purchasers or sellers run the serious risk of inviting antitrust
investigations and liability. Extending the principle of Capper-Volstead to
cooperative activity between consumers, workers, and other “Lilliputians”
in the United States political economy would foster the growth of
cooperative entities.
A legislative generalization of the Capper-Volstead Act should have
clear boundaries over who can participate and what entities and activities
are protected from antitrust liability. As in the Capper-Volstead Act, the
exemption should be restricted to organizations that are established for the
mutual benefit of co-op members.240 To ensure that cooperatives are
democratically governed, the general cooperative exemption should be
available only to organizations that follow the one member, one vote
principle.241 This requirement would be more restrictive than the CapperVolstead Act, which does not require protected cooperatives to be run on
democratic lines. To qualify for the Capper-Volstead exemption, a
cooperative can either follow the one member, one vote principle or limit
annual dividends at 8 percent.242 Democratic governance should not be
optional for cooperatives entitled to antitrust immunity. A requirement for
one-member-one-vote governance would advance a core democratic value

239. See supra Section IV.B.1.
240. The Capper-Volstead Act’s antitrust exemption applies only to “associations . . .
operated for the mutual benefit of the members” and requires that “association[s] shall not
deal in the products of nonmembers to an amount greater in value than such as are handled
by it for members.” 7 U.S.C. § 291.
241. Some states are diluting this core principle of cooperatives. In November 2017,
Wisconsin changed its cooperative law to allow co-ops to authorize members to vote in
proportion to patronage or equity ownership. UW CTR. FOR COOPERATIVES, Summary:
2017 Changes to Wisconsin’s Cooperative Law (Dec. 4, 2017), http://bit.ly/2YZ8NFh.
242. See id.
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of cooperatives and the historical cooperative movement, as well as protect
against managerial and non-member misuse of the cooperative form.243
A general cooperative immunity should also draw on the CapperVolstead Act’s pro-consumer framework. The statute grants the USDA the
authority to investigate and remedy cooperative conduct that unduly
enhances consumer prices.244 This special provision allows the USDA to
protect the public against cooperatives that gain market power and raise
prices to consumers above a fair level. This authority ensures that
cooperatives cannot unduly enrich themselves at the expense of the
consuming public. Instead of the specialized USDA, the FTC (which has
jurisdiction over most sectors of the economy) could be granted authority
to investigate cooperatives that have market power and raise prices to the
detriment of retail consumers or otherwise impair the public interest.
Alternatively, a specialized regulator devoted exclusively to co-ops could
be given this power.245
The courts have added two important glosses to the Capper-Volstead
Act that should be included in a general statutory exemption for
cooperatives. First, the exemption is limited to cooperatives comprised
entirely of producers—namely farmers. The presence of a single nonfarmer, such as a corporate processor, deprives the cooperative of CapperVolstead immunity. This condition ensures that investor-owned
businesses cannot immunize their anticompetitive conduct by creating or
joining agricultural cooperatives. A statutory expansion of CapperVolstead should adopt an analogous requirement and restrict cooperative
membership to discrete classes of individuals and businesses.
Justice William Brennan explained the importance of clearly defining
who is—and is not—eligible for Capper-Volstead immunity in his
concurrence in National Broiler Marketing Assn. v. United States:246
It is hard to believe that in enacting a provision to authorize horizontal
combinations for purposes of collective processing, handling, and
marketing so as to eliminate middlemen, Congress authorized firms
which integrated further downstream beyond the level at which
cooperatives could be utilized for these purposes to combine horizontally
as a cartel with license to carve up the national agricultural market. Such
a construction would turn on its head Congress’ manifest purpose to
243. See Douglas, supra note 134 (“According to its 2016 financial statement, 60
percent of DFA’s net income that year came from ‘non-member business earnings,’ none
of which was shared with members.”).
244. See 7 U.S.C. § 292.
245. By way of example, the National Credit Union Administration is responsible for
regulating federally insured credit unions. NAT’L CREDIT UNION, ADMIN., Historical
Timeline http://bit.ly/2WFj8Zx (last visited June 1, 2019).
246. See generally Nat’l Broiler Marketing Ass’n. v. United States, 436 U.S. 816
(1978).
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protect the small, individual economic units engaged in farming from
exploitation and extinction at the hands of “these large aggregations of
men who control the avenues and agencies through and by which farm
products reach the consuming market,” by exempting instead, and
thereby fomenting “these great trusts, these great corporations, these
large moneyed institutions” at which the Sherman Act took aim.247

Informed by Justice Brennan’s insights, a general antitrust exemption
for cooperatives should be restricted to workers, consumers, and bona fide
small businesses that fall below certain size thresholds (including
federations of such cooperatives that permit the realization of economies
of scale). The alternative is an exemption that allows medium-sized and
large corporations to use the cooperative form to obtain antitrust
immunity.
Second, the Supreme Court has also held that agricultural
cooperatives, notwithstanding the Capper-Volstead’s exemption, can still
be liable for exclusionary and predatory conduct.248 In other words,
farmers can establish a cooperative without running afoul of the Sherman
Act’s Section 1 prohibition on restraints of trade, but these cooperatives
are still subject to the Sherman Act’s Section 2 prohibition on
monopolization and attempted monopolization. The Court’s interpretation
ensures that agricultural cooperatives cannot resort to exclusionary
practices, such as exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, and tying, to
acquire or maintain market dominance. Although they have different
objectives and incentives than investor-owned businesses, large
cooperatives may also engage in socially harmful monopolization.249
Whereas the Capper-Volstead Act arguably immunizes mergers
between cooperatives from antitrust law,250 a legislative exemption for

247. Id. at 835 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
248. United States v. Borden, Co., 308 U.S. 182, 204–05 (1939).
249. E.g., Andrew Martin, In Dairy Industry Consolidation, Lush Payday, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2WAxTgd (describing allegations of nation’s largest
dairy cooperative entering into contracts with milk bottlers that enriched co-op
management and hurt dairy farmer members).
250. Peter C. Carstensen, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Law: Obsolete Statutes
in a Dynamic Economy, 58 S.D. L. REV. 462, 487 (2013). One court held that agricultural
co-ops can acquire a monopoly position through mergers and acquisitions.
[T]he effect of Capper-Volstead is to prevent the full application of the second
element of this test to agricultural cooperatives. Capper-Volstead permits the
formation of such cooperatives and places no limitation on their size. As the
cooperative grows, so, normally, does its power over the market. Thus, while the
formation, growth and operation of a powerful cooperative is obviously a
“willful acquisition or maintenance of such power,” and will rarely result from
“a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident,” id., it is exactly what
Capper-Volstead permits. We conclude that Grinnell does not apply to monopoly
power that results from such acts as the formation, growth and combination of
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cooperative enterprises should not exempt cooperatives from merger rules.
Unchecked mergers and acquisitions among cooperatives are undesirable
for at least two reasons. First, large cooperatives may face serious
governance issues that defeat the very purpose of the cooperative form. In
a large cooperative, members may only exercise weak oversight over the
cooperative’s board and management.251 As a result, the board and
management may have the latitude to run the cooperative for their own
benefit, rather than members’ benefit. Certain large agricultural
cooperatives have suffered from deficient governance in which executives
have elevated their own interests above those of members’ collective
interests.252 In general, small and medium-sized cooperatives are more
likely to be democratically accountable than their larger counterparts.
Second, although cooperatives’ ownership structure is likely to restrain
socially undesirable conduct to an extent,253 large cooperatives can work
against the interests of consumers, producers, workers, and rivals.254
To ensure that cooperatives work for members and in accordance
with the larger public interest, a statutory antitrust exemption should
include restrictions on cooperatives’ mergers and acquisitions.
Cooperative mergers should be reviewed using the same substantive
standards as mergers between investor-owned businesses under the
Clayton Act.255 At the same time, this merger standard should not restrict
agricultural cooperatives, but applies only to the acquisition of such power by
other, predatory means.
Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc. 635 F.2d 1037, 1045 (2d Cir. 1980).
251. See Carstensen, supra note 250, at 479–80.
252. E.g., Peggy Lowe, Farmers and Their Cooperative Settle Lawsuit on Fixing The
Price Of Milk, NPR (Jan. 23, 2013, 3:33 AM), https://n.pr/2YZAxcP. To be sure, the
governance problems at some large cooperatives arise, in part, from weak state cooperative
governance laws. These laws should be revised to ensure that cooperatives are run in the
interests of members. See Carstensen, supra note 250, at 478–80, 490–91.
253. See supra Section III.C.
254. See Douglas, supra note 134; Carstensen, supra note 250, at 478–81. The record
of non-profit hospitals can inform the antitrust treatment of cooperatives. In deciding
government challenges to hospital mergers, some courts have assumed that non-profit
hospitals are less likely to exercise their market power and more likely to pursue a broad
community mission. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F.
Supp. 1285, 1295 (W.D. Mich. 1996). Empirical research, however, finds that non-profit
hospitals often behave similarly to their for-profit counterparts and should be subject to
comparable antitrust rules. Gary J. Young et al., Comty. Control and Pricing Patterns of
Nonprofit Hospitals: An Antitrust Analysis, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1051, 1054
(2000); Cory Capps et al., Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofits: Should Hospitals Receive
Special Care?, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. WORKING PAPER SERIES, 36–37 (2017).
http://bit.ly/2HQXw4o.
255. The Clayton Act states:
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or
more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where
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cooperatives from growing by attracting new members. Seeking growth
through new membership involves a different dynamic than attempting to
grow through mergers and acquisitions with other cooperatives. To attract
new members, a cooperative may need to show that it works for, and
delivers tangible benefits to, existing members. By contrast, in a growththrough-merger strategy, a cooperative board and management may be
able to expand the membership rolls without appealing to new and existing
members and may even be able to advance their private interests at the
expense of members’ interests. 256 This distinction is analogous to a
traditional distinction in American merger law: growth through product
improvement and investment in new plants is preferable to growth through
mergers and acquisitions.257
Although large co-op mergers should be discouraged, cooperatives
should have broad freedom to establish federated and other joint activities
with other cooperatives to achieve economies of scale and build new
productive facilities. Small cooperatives, in particular, may not have the
means to undertake certain projects. But pursued in conjunction with one
or more cooperatives, a cooperative can acquire the necessary resources to
make these investments. For instance, a small retail cooperative may not
have the resources to establish a regional warehouse to store inventory. In
partnership with another retail cooperative, however, it may be able to
construct and run this warehouse and consequently lower their costs of
purchase and distribution of goods. Under this policy of restricting
mergers but tolerating joint ventures, cooperatives would be able to
achieve the virtues of both democratic accountability associated with
smaller size and the economies of scale resulting from combining certain
operations.258
in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use
of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18. The current approach to merger review is fact intensive. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010),
https://bit.ly/1FbvENe.
256. See KNAPP, supra note 86, at 252 (describing how the California citrus
growers’ cooperative attracted new members through more efficient, effective marketing
activity).
257. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (“[S]urely one
premise of an antimerger statute such as § 7 [of the Clayton Act] is that corporate growth
by internal expansion is socially preferable to growth by acquisition.”); Sandeep Vaheesan,
American Prosperity Depends on Stopping Mega-Mergers, FT ALPHAVILLE (Apr. 25,
2019), https://on.ft.com/2DwQGyk (“[S]trong merger policy channels corporate
executives’ focus away from the next big deal and toward product improvement and
investment that deliver more affordable and higher quality goods and services.”).
258. See KNAPP, supra note 86, at 252 (“In theory and practice, the [citrus fruit]
growers through their local associations retained full autonomy. They delegated to the
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Courts: Synthesize Existing Antitrust Doctrines to Promote
Growth of Democratically Accountable Cooperatives

The courts can draw on and synthesize existing precedent to protect
bona fide cooperatives259 and ensure that they work in the interests of their
members. The principles stated in Northwest Wholesale Stationers v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.260 and Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp.261 together can be employed to insulate
cooperatives with little market power from antitrust challenge. As for
cooperatives with substantial market power, the non-discrimination
requirement in Associated Press can be applied to dominant and other
powerful cooperatives to ensure that they are not engaging in monopolistic
conduct and are open to all comers.262
The courts should look to two key precedents when applying the
antitrust laws to cooperatives that lack market power. In Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, the Supreme Court held that the membership
policies of cooperatives that lack market power would be evaluated under
the rule of reason.263 The Court concluded that the expulsion of a
cooperative member—in effect a group boycott according to the ousted
co-op member—would be categorically condemned only if the
cooperative had market power.264 The cooperative at issue was a
purchasing cooperative that had integrated the buying operations of small
stationery retailers.265 As a result, it is unclear whether the principle
announced in the case would extend to bargaining cooperatives in which
members only aggregate their individual purchasing or selling power in
the market. In Copperweld, the Court held that a corporation cannot
conspire with one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries or divisions.266 The
Court held that a corporation, regardless of its internal structure, is a single
entity and, by definition, cannot conspire with itself for purposes of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.267
Drawing on and synthesizing Northwest Wholesale Stationers and
Copperweld, the courts should grant a quasi-immunity, or at least apply a
strong presumption of legality, to cooperatives without market power.
district exchanges and the central exchange only certain broad functions which they were
not in position to perform for themselves.”).
259. See supra Section V.A.
260. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985).
261. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
262. See Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945).
263. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 472 U.S. at 298.
264. See id. at 296.
265. See id. at 286.
266. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777.
267. See id.
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What constitutes a “firm” is fundamentally a legal and political question:
a collective of independent contractors could be treated as a single entity
instead of “colluding competitors.” Indeed, labor law has already treated
two nominally independent economic actors as a single entity for certain
purposes. For instance, during the latter part of the Obama administration,
the National Labor Relations Board ruled that, for instance, fast food
franchisors and franchisees can be joint employers for labor law
purposes.268 Accordingly, courts should treat a bargaining cooperative as
a single entity rather than as a “cartel” of its individual members. Applying
this principle, two members of the same cooperative could be no more
liable for price fixing than two employees within the same corporation.
For bargaining cooperatives, this doctrine would free them from the threat
of price fixing litigation and liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
One federal appellate decision has applied this logic. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in reviewing allegations of monopolization
against a federated electric generation and transmission cooperative, held
that this federation was a single entity, stating that “a conglomeration of
two or more legally distinct entities cannot conspire among themselves if

268. The National Labor Relations Board wrote:
Today, we restate the Board’s joint-employer standard to reaffirm the standard
articulated by the Third Circuit in Browning-Ferris decision. Under this standard,
the Board may find that two or more statutory employers are joint employers of
the same statutory employees if they share or codetermine those matters
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment. In determining
whether a putative joint employer meets this standard, the initial inquiry is
whether there is a common-law employment relationship with the employees in
question. If this common-law employment relationship exists, the inquiry then
turns to whether the putative joint employer possesses sufficient control over
employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment to permit meaningful
collective bargaining.
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, *2 (2015) (internal citations
omitted). But see Press Release, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD., Board Proposes Rule to
Change Its Joint-Employer Standard (Sep. 13, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RZapjl. For a
comparable legal rule in antitrust, consider the issue of whether consumers not in
contractual privity with an antitrust violator can recover damages. The Supreme Court has
barred consumer suits for damages when the consumer did not have a direct relationship
with the antitrust violator. See generally Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Courts, however, have established an exception to this rule when consumers purchased the
affected goods from an intermediary over whom the alleged antitrust violator exercises
control. See id. at 736 n.16 (“Another situation in which market forces have been
superseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct purchaser is
owned or controlled by its customer.”). See, e.g., Kentucky v. Marathon Petroleum Co.,
No. 3:15-cv-354-DJH-CHL 2018 WL 4620621, at *11 (W.D. Ky. 2018) (“The [c]ourt . . .
finds that the Commonwealth has sufficiently alleged ‘functional economic unity’ between
Marathon LP and the retailers in question to make a sale of gasoline to the retailers
effectively a sale to Kentucky consumers.”).
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they ‘pursue the common interests of the whole rather than interests
separate from those of the [group] itself.’”269
At the same time, dominant co-ops should face clear limits on their
behavior. The Supreme Court has recognized the market power of
dominant co-ops and established appropriate restrictions on their
discretion. In Associated Press, the Court applied special duties on a
dominant cooperative. The Court held that a dominant cooperative news
service improperly excluded non-member newspapers from obtaining its
news stories and joining the cooperative.270 Because of the Court’s
decision, AP could not use its power to control the competitive landscape
of the news publishing business across the country. Furthermore, the
decision required AP to operate as an open, democratic cooperative instead
of as a closed, exclusive monopoly. The principle announced in this case
advanced a competitive market for news and also the basic principles of
cooperative business and should apply to all dominant cooperatives.
C.

Federal Antitrust Agencies: Draw a Distinction Between
Joint Action Among Relatively Powerless Actors and
Corporate Collusion

Even in the absence of Congressional or judicial reforms to insulate
cooperatives from antitrust lawsuits, the DOJ and FTC should exercise
their prosecutorial discretion to protect bona fide bargaining cooperatives.
They should focus on corporate cartels, mergers, and monopolies rather
than cooperatives composed of consumers, small businesses, and workers.
Putting aside antitrust philosophy, this prioritization makes sense on
pragmatic grounds too. With limited enforcement resources, the agencies
should not police the conduct of these entities. By way of example, a
hypothetical agency’s use of public money to sue a consumer purchasing
cooperative is, at best, a questionable use of public money and, at worst,
indefensible enforcement activity. At a time of rising concentration across
the economy, the federal antitrust agencies should focus their advocacy
and enforcement activities on corporate monopolies and oligopolies.
Collusive conduct between large corporations carries radically
different economic, political, and social implications than collusion
between consumers, small businesses, or workers. Indeed, workers
banding together to bargain collectively with employers is commonly
described as solidarity, not collusion. This language of collusion versus
solidarity captures a critical distinction between large businesses
conspiring to enhance their economic and political power and workers
269. City of Mt. Pleasant v. Assoc. Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 274 (8th Cir.
1988).
270. See Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1945).
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banding together to build countervailing power. Individuals who have
nothing to sell in the market but their labor power have little or no
power.271 For millions, a job—any job—may be their only source of
income and the only thing standing between subsistence and destitution.272
Similarly, one consumer has little clout in the market: an individual
boycotting a company for its deceptive marketing, product quality, or
labor practices has no more than symbolic and personal psychic value. In
sharp contrast, corporations that control a nation’s means of production
wield a great deal of economic, political, and social power. Often times, a
large corporation can exercise power unilaterally and need not resort to
collusion with rivals.273
The antitrust agencies should establish a posture of deference toward
bargaining cooperatives through guidance documents. Through
enforcement guidance, they could commit to not investigating or initiating
enforcement actions against collective entities composed of consumers,
small businesses, or workers when they engage in joint bargaining.
Although this may sound radical, it would be a pragmatic exercise of
discretion. Even from the perspective of consumer welfare, the antitrust
agencies surely have more pressing targets than the professional
associations representing ice-skating coaches and music teachers.274 The
new deference policy would signal to the public that the DOJ and the FTC
271. The Supreme Court in the early twentieth century, despite its generally pro-elite
(and anti-populist) orientation, recognized the importance of collective action among
workers. The Court in Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184
(1921) stated:
A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent
ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the
employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union
was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer.
Id. at 209.
272. See Emmanuel Saez, Income and Wealth Inequality: Evidence and Policy
Implications, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 7, 8 (2017) (“For the bottom 90% of income
earners, capital income is negligible relative to labor income.”); FED. RESERVE SYS., supra
note 63, at 26 (noting that less than half of adults have sufficient personal savings to cover
three months of expenses in the event of a major financial disruption).
273. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 63–67 (1965). A Second Circuit decision offers a useful definition of
market power and ways to identify its existence:
Market power has been defined by the Supreme Court to mean the power to
control prices or exclude competition. Such power may be proven through
evidence of specific conduct undertaken by the defendant that indicates he has
the power to affect price or exclude competition. Alternatively, market power
may be presumed if the defendant controls a large enough share of the relevant
market.
United States v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal citations
omitted).
274. See supra Section III.A.1.
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would not interfere with the bargaining activities of relatively powerless
actors and instead would use their resources to investigate and bring
enforcement actions against corporate mergers and monopolies. Short of
this general non-prosecution commitment against cooperatives, composed
of relatively powerless members, the agencies could revise the Competitor
Collaboration Guidelines to indicate they will not sue bargaining entities
composed of consumers, small businesses, or workers that have a market
share less than 30 percent.275 The policy would grant broad latitude to
cooperative entities, yet allow the antitrust agencies to police the activities
of co-ops with market power.
Neither proposed change to enforcement practice would grant
cooperatives absolute antitrust immunity. In contrast to potential
legislation enacted by Congress or judicial revision of existing legal
precedent, the antitrust agencies cannot change the substantive law
through guidance documents. Even if they pledge not to investigate
cooperatives or rewrite their Competitor Collaboration Guidelines to
protect cooperative activity, the substantive standards of the Sherman Act
would be unchanged. Private parties could still bring lawsuits against
bargaining cooperatives for engaging in illegal price fixing.
Nonetheless, these suggested policy changes, if adopted, would
confer significant benefits to bargaining cooperatives. First, a commitment
from the antitrust agencies to not pursue investigations and enforcement
actions would greatly reduce the legal risk to bargaining cooperatives.
Despite the possibility of private antitrust actions, the investigative and
enforcement activities of the antitrust agencies may be the greatest
antitrust threat to many cooperatives.276 Second, the revised Competitor
Collaboration Guidelines may receive deference in the courts. Today, the
courts consistently grant significant deference to agency guidance
documents.277 Even in private lawsuits, the courts may treat the revised
Guidelines as persuasive evidence in deciding, for instance, whether the
per se rule should apply to bargaining cooperatives. Moreover, the per se
prohibition on price fixing is not as absolute as appearances may suggest.
On occasion, the Supreme Court has considered economic circumstances
in cases alleging horizontal collusion and qualified the application of the

275. Grimes, supra note 195, at 234.
276. See Paul, supra note 189, at 981–82 (describing how truck drivers in several
major ports were hit with an FTC investigation when they attempted to unionize and had
to account for antitrust liability when they organized).
277. See Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger
Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 781–808 (2006)
(examining growing influence on Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the courts over the past
40 years).
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per se rule against price fixing when it believed that cooperation among
rivals yielded economic and social benefits.278
D.

States: Authorize and Actively Supervise Cooperatives

The Supreme Court has created the state action immunity to protect
the legislative and regulatory of states from antitrust attack. States can
enact statutes and regulations that restrict competition without risk of
antitrust liability. Private parties can also invoke the state action immunity
if they can establish that they are acting pursuant to clearly articulated state
policy and subject to active supervision by the state. Like other private
entities, cooperative businesses are entitled to the state action immunity
and protection from antitrust lawsuits if they satisfy this two-part test.
The Court established this doctrine in the 1943 decision Parker v.
Brown.279 The plaintiff in that case challenged a California regulatory
scheme that governed the production and distribution of raisins.280 The
Supreme Court held that the state was immune from antitrust liability. It
wrote that “[t]he Sherman Act makes no mention of the state . . . and gives
no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action
directed by a state.”281 The Court further noted that “[t]he sponsor of the
bill which was ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act declared that it
prevented only ‘business combinations.’”282 While a group of private
producers who engaged in collusion would face antitrust liability, this
conduct was immune once it had the imprimatur of state sanction.283

278. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9–10
(1979); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Oklahoma, 468 U.S.
85, 100–01 (1984). In a case heard during the depths of the Great Depression, the Supreme
Court declined to hold price fixing by a group of small coal producers as per se illegal.
A cooperative enterprise, otherwise free from objection, which carries with it no
monopolistic menace, is not to be condemned as an undue restraint merely
because it may effect a change in market conditions, where the change would be
in mitigation of recognized evils and would not impair, but rather foster, fair
competitive opportunities. Voluntary action to rescue and preserve these
opportunities, and thus to aid in relieving a depressed industry and in reviving
commerce by placing competition upon a sounder basis, may be more efficacious
than an attempt to provide remedies through legal processes. . . . Putting an end
to injurious practices, and the consequent improvement of the competitive
position of a group of producers, is not a less worthy aim and may be entirely
consonant with the public interest, where the group must still meet effective
competition in a fair market and neither seeks nor is able to effect a domination
of prices.
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 373–74 (1934)
279. See generally Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
280. See id. at 344–45.
281. Id. at 351.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 350–51.
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The Court later articulated the standard by which private parties could
qualify for the state action immunity. In California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc,284 the Court held that the activities of
private parties were immune from antitrust challenge if they satisfied two
conditions.285 The Court wrote that “first, the challenged restraint must be
one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; second,
the policy must be actively supervised by the State itself.”286 State-granted
authority to act is not sufficient to satisfy the first prong; the
anticompetitive outcome must be “the ‘foreseeable result’ of what the
State authorized.”287 Active supervision means that a state entity reviewed
the substance of the anticompetitive act and exercised the power to ratify
or reject it.288 Unless both conditions are met, a private party is not entitled
to state action immunity.
In a 2015 decision, the Supreme Court further clarified the meaning
of active supervision by the state. In North Carolina Board of State Dental
Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission,289 the Court held that private
actors had to be supervised by an independent state authority to qualify for
the state action immunity.290 Supervision by a state agency “dominated by
market participants” does not satisfy the active supervision requirement.291
The majority wrote that such state agencies are indistinguishable from
private trade associations and “pose the very risk of self-dealing [the
active] supervision requirement was created to address.”292 As a result, for
such agencies to claim state action immunity they must show that they are
acting pursuant not only to clearly articulated state policy but also are
subject to active supervision by the state.293
States can use the state action doctrine to promote the growth of
democratically accountable cooperatives. They can pass laws authorizing
cooperatives to engage in collaborative activities and subject this joint
conduct to active state supervision. By doing so, states can limit the
application of federal antitrust laws to cooperatives. Because every state

284.
(1980).
285.
286.
287.
(2013).
288.
289.
(2015).
290.
291.
292.
293.

See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
Id. at 105.
Id.
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 217
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992).
See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1114.
See id. at 1113.
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already has a statute for chartering cooperatives,294 states would
principally have to work toward establishing regulatory oversight. This
oversight could be provided through the executive branch, courts, or
regulatory agencies, but importantly not through a state agency
“dominated by market participants.”295 Provided they are acting pursuant
to state authorization and supervision, cooperatives would have greater
freedom to operate. While cooperatives would not enjoy legal carte
blanche, they would be free to engage in joint action that may otherwise
run afoul of the federal antitrust laws. For instance, a bargaining
cooperative composed of small businesses would be immune from federal
antitrust law so long as it acts pursuant to state authority and is actively
supervised by a state agency. State law and regulation can account for the
distinctive needs and objectives of cooperatives, which may not always
conform to the prevailing strictures of antitrust law.
VI. CONCLUSION
When Congress saw fit, as Senator Capper put it, “to give to the
farmer the same right to bargain collectively that is already enjoyed by
corporations,”296 it affirmed the principle that distributed, competitive, and
democratic activity ought to have a place in the economy alongside
investor-owned corporations. The constituency most endangered by
corporate power in 1922, and best organized to counter it, were farmers.
For decades they formed cooperative enterprises as a means of
counteracting the concentrated market power of bankers, suppliers, and
railroads.297 The Capper-Volstead Act was a means of affirming the value
of those cooperative enterprises, and the kind of business they enabled, by
ensuring that antitrust law did not mistake cooperation between powerless
actors for collusion among corporations.
Today, the concerns that motivated Capper-Volstead have spread far
beyond just farmers. Throughout the United States economy, especially in
the emerging online economy, consolidation has become the norm. Small
businesses face growing barriers to market entry and the growing ranks of
independent workers find themselves at the mercy of the overwhelming
market power of large corporations. As they did a century ago, people are
now looking to cooperative ownership designs as a strategy for leveling
the playing field with investor-owned corporations, but cooperative firms

294. See, e.g., State Cooperative Statute Library, NAT’L COOPERATIVE BUS. ASSN.
CLUSA INT’L, https://ncbaclusa.coop/resources/state-cooperative-statute-library/ (last
visited Sep. 6, 2019).
295. N.C. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 135 S. Ct. at 1116.
296. 62 CONG. REC. 2057 (1922).
297. See generally KNAPP, supra note 86.
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can face undue barriers and inadequate recognition for their contributions
to ensuring a diverse and democratic economy.
In the context of the renewed interest in antitrust policy, the legacy
and promise of cooperative enterprise deserves fresh consideration.
Statutes such as the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act, along with
various Supreme Court decisions, have secured a role for cooperatives in
the United States antitrust tradition. That role should be no less significant
in an age when online platforms are doing the work once done by railroads,
when once again nascent kinds of natural-monopoly activity present both
opportunities and dilemmas. The ambitions of Senator Capper and his
bill’s supporters have economy-wide relevance and should not be limited
to agriculture or any other subset of economic activity. Accordingly,
antitrust law and policy should protect cooperation outside of agriculture
alone. Genuine cooperative enterprise is something that should not only
be tolerated but also encouraged.
This Article proposes a series of interventions for how the spirit of
Capper-Volstead might find new life today. First, Congress can extend the
logic of that precedent to sectors outside of agriculture. Currently, when
consolidation has spread to so many sectors, having such recognition
limited to agriculture alone looks less like a considered choice than an
accident of history. Second, courts can recognize the virtues of cooperative
enterprise in their antitrust rulings and use such models as a tool for
protecting beneficial economies of scale while retaining competition and
diversity in markets. Third, federal agencies can distinguish between
cooperation among the powerless and collusion among powerful
corporations in their enforcement of antitrust law. Fourth, states can
protect and supervise co-ops incorporated under their laws to ensure
appropriately democratic practices and participation. Each of these
recommendations calls for not just more generous treatment of
cooperatives; it is equally necessary to revive a tradition of oversight to
ensure that co-op businesses are, in fact, operating cooperatively and in
the public interest.
Antimonopoly proponents have already called for restoring a broader
set of analytical and legal tools for understanding and restructuring
monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. Consumer price is an insufficient
measure of anticompetitive behavior when services can be delivered by
monopolistic actors for free or very low cost in the short term—consider
ridesharing, online search, and product delivery. Reformers are calling for
antitrust to protect the public from the full economic and political power
of corporations. Thus far, ownership design largely has been neglected in
their proposals. While protections that farmers fought for a century ago
may be discounted or dismissed in an era of big-box retail and online
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networks, matters of ownership design have at least as much relevance
today and should be a part of the antimonopoly arsenal.

